John Arquilla
By John Arquilla
It is an axiom that generals tend to fight the last war, but the truth is that, as often as not, they would like to forget the last war. Witness Vietnam, in the wake of which it took more than three decades for a new counterinsurgency manual to be written by General David Petraeus and others.
Happily, the military waited only five years to commence work on an update of the Petraeus version. As this new effort unfolds, based on the latest experience in Afghanistan, it might prove useful to incorporate the kind of analysis that the late Harry Summers, a soldier and strategist par excellence, employed in his study of the debacle in Vietnam, published a scant seven years after the fall of Saigon. Given the fresh attention being focused on military options in Syria, as outlined in General Martin Dempsey’s letter to the Senate this week, there is more reason to remember Summers.
His study, On Strategy was inspired by the German philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas about how difficult it is to know what is really happening and to take effective action because of factors like the omnipresent “fog of war” and “friction.” As Clausewitz put it: “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” Summers accepted this, but persisted, using as reference points for analysis classical notions of the principles of war as elucidated by the Baron Antoine Jomini, a Napoleonic officer, and later codified in US Army field manuals.
The principles are, in the order he used them: the objective, the offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. What Summers concluded in his analysis of the Vietnam War was that the US military’s performance, viewed in light of these principles, was problematic.
He found that it was the North Vietnamese who may have employed them more effectively. Category by category, on a notional, worst-to-best 1-10 rating scale (intended not as holy writ, but to spark discourse), a review of six of the nine principles — the ones that he examined most closely — might go like this:
The objective
In Afghanistan, the goal of toppling the Taliban was easily achieved, but damaging the Al Qaeda network — much less getting Bin Laden — took a long time. Further, nation-building has proved complicated, to say the least. In Iraq, regime change was effected, but there were no weapons of mass destruction, and whatever ties there were to Al Qaeda arose only in the wake of the US invasion. The establishment of democracy resulted in the victory of a political movement more aligned with Tehran than with Washington. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi was killed, but Al Qaeda prospers there and Islamists struck a blow against the US in Benghazi. (Scores: Afghanistan, 6; Iraq, 4; Libya, 5.)
The offensive
The intervention in Afghanistan began with a striking, swarming attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces; then there was much strategic drift for several years, with the resurgent Taliban eventually seizing the initiative. They still hold it as American and Nato forces are leaving. The Iraq War was also begun with an impressive offensive, but insurgents soon began to dictate the course of events, and did so through late 2006. Thereafter US forces found a way to shift the momentum and the situation improved markedly — before they simply left at the end of 2011. In Libya, Gaddafi’s forces clearly held the upper hand until Nato’s intervention, after which they were almost completely on the defensive. (Scores: Afghanistan, 4; Iraq, 7; Libya, 9.)
MassING
Troop levels started out quite low in Afghanistan, but eventually built up substantially, including a “surge” that had little material effect on the insurgency. Now numbers are dwindling, despite a resurgent Taliban. In Iraq, the size of the initial invading force was far greater than that used in Afghanistan, and was augmented by a surge in 2007 that saw improved results in its wake — though not necessarily caused by increased numbers, as new tactics and concepts of operations were employed. In Libya, the notion of massing can be applied to the use of concentrated air power, and perhaps to the “massing of information” that American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets provided. (Scores: Afghanistan, 7; Iraq, 8; Libya, 2.)
Economy of force
In some respects, this category is the reverse of mass. In Afghanistan, early operations were very lean — just 200 sets of “boots on the ground” in the form of 11 Special Forces A-teams. But eventually numbers grew to around 200,000 in the International Security Assistance Force. About 100,000 are still there; after 2014, perhaps just a few thousand will remain. The total cost to date is about $800bn. In Iraq, numbers started out in the 150,000-plus range, and stayed in six-figures for some seven years — at a cost of over a trillion dollars. In Libya, there may have been a handful of Nato operatives on the ground, and some hundreds of aircraft were employed, at a total cost of a billion dollars or so. (Scores: Afghanistan, 5; Iraq, 2; Libya, 10.)
Manoeuvre
The opening phase in Afghanistan was remarkable, striking at the Taliban and Al Qaeda swiftly, in many places simultaneously, like a swarm. Later on, though, more centralised, predictable actions became — and have largely remained — the rule. Now the focus on “village stability” means more hunkering down than manoeuvring. In Iraq, the initial “thunder run” to Baghdad was a powerful display of modern mobile warfare. The ensuing battles of Fallujah were less about manoeuvre and far more about firepower. But in 2007, a very skilful swarming attack was mounted against Al Qaeda in Anbar Province and elsewhere. In Libya, there was very little that could be described, on either side, in terms of skillful manoeuvre. (Scores: Afghanistan, 5; Iraq, 7; Libya, 1.)
Interpretation
Well, a numerical average of the scores would reflect the following: Afghanistan, 4.8; Iraq, 6; Libya, 5.5. This suggests to me that the results achieved in the conduct of the war in Iraq — despite the debatable context of the conflict — may prove of great future value to soldiers and strategists. But this sort of analysis can also be usefully deconstructed, beginning with questions about whether all these principles are of equal weight. For example, if “mass” means less in the future, and “economy of force” grows more important, then clearly Libya is the case to study. As to Afghanistan, one can only leave this analysis with a sense of irony that a campaign begun so well now teeters on the brink of a losing endgame. But even here lies a deep lesson — albeit about a principle poorly followed — regarding unity of command.
All in all, this approach to strategic assessment can help distill much of the educational value from our most recent conflicts, and may suggest a way of thinking about the Syrian civil war.
As the intervention debate unfolds — with some in Congress urging action and the Pentagon calling for caution — Summers would no doubt remind senior decision-makers about the primacy of the objective. Once this was clarified, he would surely insist that the other key principles be addressed as well — before we decide to enshroud ourselves in a fresh fog of war.
WP-BLOOMBERG
By John Arquilla
It is an axiom that generals tend to fight the last war, but the truth is that, as often as not, they would like to forget the last war. Witness Vietnam, in the wake of which it took more than three decades for a new counterinsurgency manual to be written by General David Petraeus and others.
Happily, the military waited only five years to commence work on an update of the Petraeus version. As this new effort unfolds, based on the latest experience in Afghanistan, it might prove useful to incorporate the kind of analysis that the late Harry Summers, a soldier and strategist par excellence, employed in his study of the debacle in Vietnam, published a scant seven years after the fall of Saigon. Given the fresh attention being focused on military options in Syria, as outlined in General Martin Dempsey’s letter to the Senate this week, there is more reason to remember Summers.
His study, On Strategy was inspired by the German philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz’s ideas about how difficult it is to know what is really happening and to take effective action because of factors like the omnipresent “fog of war” and “friction.” As Clausewitz put it: “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” Summers accepted this, but persisted, using as reference points for analysis classical notions of the principles of war as elucidated by the Baron Antoine Jomini, a Napoleonic officer, and later codified in US Army field manuals.
The principles are, in the order he used them: the objective, the offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity. What Summers concluded in his analysis of the Vietnam War was that the US military’s performance, viewed in light of these principles, was problematic.
He found that it was the North Vietnamese who may have employed them more effectively. Category by category, on a notional, worst-to-best 1-10 rating scale (intended not as holy writ, but to spark discourse), a review of six of the nine principles — the ones that he examined most closely — might go like this:
The objective
In Afghanistan, the goal of toppling the Taliban was easily achieved, but damaging the Al Qaeda network — much less getting Bin Laden — took a long time. Further, nation-building has proved complicated, to say the least. In Iraq, regime change was effected, but there were no weapons of mass destruction, and whatever ties there were to Al Qaeda arose only in the wake of the US invasion. The establishment of democracy resulted in the victory of a political movement more aligned with Tehran than with Washington. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi was killed, but Al Qaeda prospers there and Islamists struck a blow against the US in Benghazi. (Scores: Afghanistan, 6; Iraq, 4; Libya, 5.)
The offensive
The intervention in Afghanistan began with a striking, swarming attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces; then there was much strategic drift for several years, with the resurgent Taliban eventually seizing the initiative. They still hold it as American and Nato forces are leaving. The Iraq War was also begun with an impressive offensive, but insurgents soon began to dictate the course of events, and did so through late 2006. Thereafter US forces found a way to shift the momentum and the situation improved markedly — before they simply left at the end of 2011. In Libya, Gaddafi’s forces clearly held the upper hand until Nato’s intervention, after which they were almost completely on the defensive. (Scores: Afghanistan, 4; Iraq, 7; Libya, 9.)
MassING
Troop levels started out quite low in Afghanistan, but eventually built up substantially, including a “surge” that had little material effect on the insurgency. Now numbers are dwindling, despite a resurgent Taliban. In Iraq, the size of the initial invading force was far greater than that used in Afghanistan, and was augmented by a surge in 2007 that saw improved results in its wake — though not necessarily caused by increased numbers, as new tactics and concepts of operations were employed. In Libya, the notion of massing can be applied to the use of concentrated air power, and perhaps to the “massing of information” that American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets provided. (Scores: Afghanistan, 7; Iraq, 8; Libya, 2.)
Economy of force
In some respects, this category is the reverse of mass. In Afghanistan, early operations were very lean — just 200 sets of “boots on the ground” in the form of 11 Special Forces A-teams. But eventually numbers grew to around 200,000 in the International Security Assistance Force. About 100,000 are still there; after 2014, perhaps just a few thousand will remain. The total cost to date is about $800bn. In Iraq, numbers started out in the 150,000-plus range, and stayed in six-figures for some seven years — at a cost of over a trillion dollars. In Libya, there may have been a handful of Nato operatives on the ground, and some hundreds of aircraft were employed, at a total cost of a billion dollars or so. (Scores: Afghanistan, 5; Iraq, 2; Libya, 10.)
Manoeuvre
The opening phase in Afghanistan was remarkable, striking at the Taliban and Al Qaeda swiftly, in many places simultaneously, like a swarm. Later on, though, more centralised, predictable actions became — and have largely remained — the rule. Now the focus on “village stability” means more hunkering down than manoeuvring. In Iraq, the initial “thunder run” to Baghdad was a powerful display of modern mobile warfare. The ensuing battles of Fallujah were less about manoeuvre and far more about firepower. But in 2007, a very skilful swarming attack was mounted against Al Qaeda in Anbar Province and elsewhere. In Libya, there was very little that could be described, on either side, in terms of skillful manoeuvre. (Scores: Afghanistan, 5; Iraq, 7; Libya, 1.)
Interpretation
Well, a numerical average of the scores would reflect the following: Afghanistan, 4.8; Iraq, 6; Libya, 5.5. This suggests to me that the results achieved in the conduct of the war in Iraq — despite the debatable context of the conflict — may prove of great future value to soldiers and strategists. But this sort of analysis can also be usefully deconstructed, beginning with questions about whether all these principles are of equal weight. For example, if “mass” means less in the future, and “economy of force” grows more important, then clearly Libya is the case to study. As to Afghanistan, one can only leave this analysis with a sense of irony that a campaign begun so well now teeters on the brink of a losing endgame. But even here lies a deep lesson — albeit about a principle poorly followed — regarding unity of command.
All in all, this approach to strategic assessment can help distill much of the educational value from our most recent conflicts, and may suggest a way of thinking about the Syrian civil war.
As the intervention debate unfolds — with some in Congress urging action and the Pentagon calling for caution — Summers would no doubt remind senior decision-makers about the primacy of the objective. Once this was clarified, he would surely insist that the other key principles be addressed as well — before we decide to enshroud ourselves in a fresh fog of war.
WP-BLOOMBERG
