Colby Goodman
By Colby Goodman
Sometimes a ship is more than just a ship. The diplomatic two-step between Washington and Paris over France’s planned delivery of amphibious warship frames to the Russian military continued last week, as French President François Hollande dined with US President Barack Obama in Paris -- two hours before Hollande held a separate dinner for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since Russia annexed Crimea in March, the Obama administration has been aggressively urging Paris to suspend the sale, as it would provide the Russian military with new capabilities. On Friday, however, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius confirmed that the sale of Mistral-class warships to Russia would happen. “They represent many jobs,” he said.
In some ways, this dance looks similar to past trans-Atlantic debates on transfers of war materials to troubling destinations. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has struggled to persuade European countries to curb arms transfers to countries of concern such as China, Iran and Libya.
Typically, the United States urges its European allies to prioritise global security concerns over supporting its domestic arms industry. And in the past, the US government has succeeded in helping stem European exports to countries such as China, Iran and Libya -- because the United States practices what it preaches.
But America’s responsibility and the leverage it provides, however, appear to be evaporating. As part of the Export Control Reform Initiative, a 2010 initiative aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the US defence industry abroad, the Obama administration has been gutting critical national controls on many types of arms exports. The initiative, implemented in October 2013, means that the administration will now weigh US economic considerations in its decisions to export weapons of war -- just like France is doing with Russia.
That statement may sound innocuous, but the effect is significant. Contrast it to what the then State Department senior adviser for arms control and international security, John Holum, said in 2000: “If there is a security reason not to export a munitions item, it will not be done whether or not there is an economic consideration in favour of it.”
Holum also supported a notion that appears anathema to the Obama administration: Exports of low-tech military items should also require US government authorisation before export as they can have a dangerous effect on less-advanced countries and regions. These controls also helped safeguard US foreign-policy interests around the world.
Under the Export Control Reform Initiative, however, the State Department will now only strictly control arms that provide the US military with a critical advantage, such as target drones and stealth technology.
Tens of thousands of high- and low-tech war materials such as unarmed Black Hawk helicopters and radiation-hardened microchips, which are critical components in the operation of missiles and satellite systems, now fall under the Commerce Department’s export controls.
The administration has also created a new, narrow definition of “specially designed” in US law.
This definition -- which appears to contradict the US federal judiciary’s interpretation and the US government’s long-held position in several multilateral agreements on arms control and nonproliferation -- will allow companies to avoid export controls by deliberately designing items that can be used with controlled and uncontrolled items. In other words, if a company develops cockpit indicators for fighter jets with a secondary use in civilian planes, the indicators would likely no longer be subject to US export controls.
Although the Obama administration has recently restricted arms exports to Russia, this new definition of “specially designed” allows companies to export many types of sophisticated military equipment to the Russian military without US government review. As governments around the world review the administration’s loosening of arms export controls, many will weaken their own controls to better compete with the United States.
Canada has already lowered some of its arms export control regulations and policies. And like France, countries may also start to claim that sales of arms with civilian uses should now be more weakly controlled.
Foreign governments may also be less influenced by US government pressure to curb arms transfers to countries such as Russia and China, now that US companies can export many sophisticated US military items to these countries.
To stem this dangerous threat to global security and US foreign-policy interests, the US Congress should heed some of Holum’s advice. Requiring US companies to obtain US government approval before exporting military-related items or services to countries or institutions under US arms embargoes would help curb US arms transfers to these entities.
The US Congress should also evaluate the risks to US and global nonproliferation and enforcement efforts arising from the deregulation of US export controls on military technology and war materials.
Without effective controls added to US arms exports, the US government will continue to lose its leverage to encourage European and other countries around the world to stem problematic arms exports and proliferation to countries such as Belarus, China, Russia and Somalia.
If things continue down this path, the Obama administration may one day be blamed as the administration that helped weaken many arms export controls around the world and caused the resulting dramatic increase in arms proliferation. WP-BLOOMBERG
By Colby Goodman
Sometimes a ship is more than just a ship. The diplomatic two-step between Washington and Paris over France’s planned delivery of amphibious warship frames to the Russian military continued last week, as French President François Hollande dined with US President Barack Obama in Paris -- two hours before Hollande held a separate dinner for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Since Russia annexed Crimea in March, the Obama administration has been aggressively urging Paris to suspend the sale, as it would provide the Russian military with new capabilities. On Friday, however, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius confirmed that the sale of Mistral-class warships to Russia would happen. “They represent many jobs,” he said.
In some ways, this dance looks similar to past trans-Atlantic debates on transfers of war materials to troubling destinations. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has struggled to persuade European countries to curb arms transfers to countries of concern such as China, Iran and Libya.
Typically, the United States urges its European allies to prioritise global security concerns over supporting its domestic arms industry. And in the past, the US government has succeeded in helping stem European exports to countries such as China, Iran and Libya -- because the United States practices what it preaches.
But America’s responsibility and the leverage it provides, however, appear to be evaporating. As part of the Export Control Reform Initiative, a 2010 initiative aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the US defence industry abroad, the Obama administration has been gutting critical national controls on many types of arms exports. The initiative, implemented in October 2013, means that the administration will now weigh US economic considerations in its decisions to export weapons of war -- just like France is doing with Russia.
That statement may sound innocuous, but the effect is significant. Contrast it to what the then State Department senior adviser for arms control and international security, John Holum, said in 2000: “If there is a security reason not to export a munitions item, it will not be done whether or not there is an economic consideration in favour of it.”
Holum also supported a notion that appears anathema to the Obama administration: Exports of low-tech military items should also require US government authorisation before export as they can have a dangerous effect on less-advanced countries and regions. These controls also helped safeguard US foreign-policy interests around the world.
Under the Export Control Reform Initiative, however, the State Department will now only strictly control arms that provide the US military with a critical advantage, such as target drones and stealth technology.
Tens of thousands of high- and low-tech war materials such as unarmed Black Hawk helicopters and radiation-hardened microchips, which are critical components in the operation of missiles and satellite systems, now fall under the Commerce Department’s export controls.
The administration has also created a new, narrow definition of “specially designed” in US law.
This definition -- which appears to contradict the US federal judiciary’s interpretation and the US government’s long-held position in several multilateral agreements on arms control and nonproliferation -- will allow companies to avoid export controls by deliberately designing items that can be used with controlled and uncontrolled items. In other words, if a company develops cockpit indicators for fighter jets with a secondary use in civilian planes, the indicators would likely no longer be subject to US export controls.
Although the Obama administration has recently restricted arms exports to Russia, this new definition of “specially designed” allows companies to export many types of sophisticated military equipment to the Russian military without US government review. As governments around the world review the administration’s loosening of arms export controls, many will weaken their own controls to better compete with the United States.
Canada has already lowered some of its arms export control regulations and policies. And like France, countries may also start to claim that sales of arms with civilian uses should now be more weakly controlled.
Foreign governments may also be less influenced by US government pressure to curb arms transfers to countries such as Russia and China, now that US companies can export many sophisticated US military items to these countries.
To stem this dangerous threat to global security and US foreign-policy interests, the US Congress should heed some of Holum’s advice. Requiring US companies to obtain US government approval before exporting military-related items or services to countries or institutions under US arms embargoes would help curb US arms transfers to these entities.
The US Congress should also evaluate the risks to US and global nonproliferation and enforcement efforts arising from the deregulation of US export controls on military technology and war materials.
Without effective controls added to US arms exports, the US government will continue to lose its leverage to encourage European and other countries around the world to stem problematic arms exports and proliferation to countries such as Belarus, China, Russia and Somalia.
If things continue down this path, the Obama administration may one day be blamed as the administration that helped weaken many arms export controls around the world and caused the resulting dramatic increase in arms proliferation. WP-BLOOMBERG
