Larbi Sadiki
The Tunisian presidential race is heating up. With several frontrunners, the 26-candidate lineup for the early elections to be held on September 15th reflects a great deal of party and “party family” fragmentation. This article examines the travails and the challenges of the North African country’s second democratic presidential elections since the 2011 revolution. It shows how the presidential race is unfolding more as a personal political contest rather than a clash between competing political visions for a country weighed down by steep unemployment, deep socio-political marginalization, and massive foreign debt in a conflict-ridden region.
Many parties but three competing political currents:
These elections come at a time when the country’s political parties are experiencing political strife. From sitting Prime Minister Youcef Chahed’s departure from Nidaa Tounis (the late President Essebsi’s party) and forming of his new Tahyaa Tounes party, to intensifying factionalism within the Ennahda, these internal divisions have expanded the field of candidates in a wildly dynamic polity, including several independents.
The political scene is a far cry from the 2014 race, dominated by veteran politician Sebssi who, from within the state machinery stood head and shoulders above the other candidates, and the fuloul, remnants of Ben Ali’s regime were still shaken to the core by the 2011 revolution.
Over the next two weeks, the wide field of candidates will vie to win over voters from Tunisia’s main three political bases: The fulool or azlam of the former Tajammu’ and Destourians (remnants and loyalists of Ben Ali’s regime, now claimants to Bourguiba’s legacy), Islamists, and leftist-leaning voters.
The struggle over the votes of these various blocs brings to the fore some seeming contradictions that may or may not revitalize an increasingly politically apathetic Tunisian populace. For many, the hope was that the presidential campaign would produce some level of consensus, narrowing down the field to one candidate per party “current”. In fact, the opposite has happened.
The candidates and the campaign’s political melee
Ennahda candidate Abdelfattah Morou is challenged by now independent candidate (and former post-2011 Prime Minister) Hamad Jbali, possibly splitting the Islamist vote. Boasting few political accomplishments, Moncef Marzouki, first president of the Second Republic who counted on Ennahda voters in his advance to second round of the 2014 elections, may have exhausted his political capital. The so-called Destourian “family” offers not only Chahed, but also former Defense Minister (and Ben Ali insider) Abdelkarim Ezbidi, and ex-Nidaa member Mohsen Marzouk. Lawyer Ben Abbo, unionist Obeid Albarki, and former communist Hamma Hammami do not appear to be strong contenders.
The cacophony induces a sort of political schizophrenia replete with claims, counter-claims, and contradictions in the candidates’ rhetoric. It is no longer clear that parties are a clear frame of reference with respect to either political identity or programs. Oft-repeated among candidates is the promise to be a “president for all Tunisians,” an almost unrealistic pledge given the polarization of Tunisia’s political scene.
The 2014 constitution outlines the Presidency as a non-partisan role. Yet it is almost as if candidates are speaking in two tongues, at once seeking to win over their political bases and appealing to “all Tunisians.” The result is a sort of discomfort with political identity and membership during this first round.
The race brings with it the element of money and attendant drama. Football mogul Selim Riahi (owner of Club Africain), now with Nidaa, has been dogged by questions over the source of his wealth. The wealthy Nabil Karoui is serious competition for both Chahed and, thanks to his charity work with the marginalized in the country’s interior regions, maybe even Ennahda. The Nassma TV owner whose candidacy would have been denied had the modified election law that Essebssi failed to sign before his death gone into effect, is in custody since last week on charges of tax evasion and money laundering.
Yet the leader of Qalb Tounes remains in the race. In a democratizing political system where judicial independence still leaves much to be desired, Prime Minister Chahed fails to convince in his insistence that the arrest (duly condemned by fellow candidates) is not politically motivated. A candidate is more or less using another candidate to build steam for a failed anti-corruption “crusade”.
Then there is Abeer Moussi of the Free Dustour party. Unabashedly hearkenng back to the days of Ben Ali, she considers “revolution” a misnomer for the transformation set in motion in 2011. Moussi has made an entire campaign out of attacking Islamists (referring to Ennahda only as “al-Ikhwan”) as a putative threat to democracy and the Tunisian way of life, vowing to chase them out of politics through restored presidential powers.
Abdelkarim Zbidi is perhaps the least eloquent candidate whose stumbling during interviews has drawn attention. This communication ineptitude has not prevented the post-2011 defense minister (and former health minister under Ben Ali) from becoming a frontrunner. Depending on what verdict the Tunisians hand down, he may end up occupying the presidential palace at Carthage. Zbidi might be closest to the Western preference for leadership in Tunisia, having overseen defense and been privy to security operations. He can probably be labeled the quasi-American candidate who stands between the Islamists and key ministries, overseeing the intelligence and security portfolios in close contact with Western military and political elites. Departing from those who consider the 2014 constitution a crowning achievement of the revolution, he has promised constitutional amendments to consolidate the powers of the presidency.
Candidates from Zbidi to Morou to Chahed attempt to channel Bourguiba, vowing to uphold Tunisia’s foreign policy “neutrality.” Without fail, they rail against siyasat al-mahawir “axis politics” tearing the region asunder. What that means in practice is unclear.
Absence of vision and substance
Equally vague is the well-worn promise to rejuvenate the country’s “economic diplomacy.” Chahed, running on a “pragmatic” platform of anti-corruption and paying lip service to the untapped potential of the country’s (largely unemployed), restive youth, insists that he will renegotiate Tunisia’s agreements with the EU. (He also just dropped his French citizenship, per the constitutional mandate for presidential contenders, surprising Tunisians unaware that he has been a dual citizen all along.) Yet the candidate attempting to model himself after Bourguiba-era Prime Minister Hadi Noueira has over the last three years administered Tunisia’s $2.9 billion loan from the IMF, austerity strings attached.
His unpopular policies have sparked recurring protests in the capital as well as the country’s West and South. Construction workers and doctors are the latest to threaten an impending strike.
This record does not inspire confidence that he will reverse Tunisia’s descent into economic dependency, or limit profiteering by foreign corporations at the expense of local economic gains. His constant spouting of numbers (hundreds of thousands of families receiving aid from the state, a growth rate slowly inching toward 3%) does not mask the over 15% unemployment rate in the country—more than twice that in some governorates— skyrocketing prices, and public debt that has soared to over 70%. Tunisia’s exacerbating marginalization has prompted many “revolutionaries” of 2011 to opt out of formal politics altogether.
Islamists for presidential elections not for the presidency
Unlike the 2014 elections, the Islamists have thrown their hat into the presidential ring. Notably, their candidate is not party leader Rached Ghannouchi, but co-founder of the movement and Vice President of Parliament Abdelfattah Morou, “the best Ennahda has to offer,” according to the election slogan. Morou may possibly, given Ennahda’s 500,000-strong base, advance to round two.
But for those drawing inevitable comparisons with Egypt in 2012, some important differences emerge. Morou is not a candidate to win the presidential elections. Landing the presidency would be a real predicament for Tunisian democracy and Ennahda itself, which could sweep the board in the November parliamentary elections. Democratization will buckle under a concentration of power. Here lies the secret of the durability of the Tunisian experiment: it continually produces and reproduces some kind of political equilibrium and balance. This does not allow any one political force to prevail. This continues to be Tunisia’s most important specificity: the state will be shared as a function of political partnership, in a model closet to consociational democracy. There are winners all around, but no losers, almost.
Perhaps Ennahda has reached the political maturity as it competes for the presidency, with an eye on the the bartering to come (muqayadah). Competing with a strong presidential candidate short of winning will give it an edge in the wheeling and dealing of the 2nd round that moderates the tempo of democracy to distribute shares within the Tunisian (quasi-share holding) political system.
So it may be said that Rached Ghannouchi remains true to his word by staying out of the presidential race. He can enjoy the status of the sole political elder after Essebsi. That is, if he stays out of the next race for Parliament (and Prime Minister), too. That would be a better position, lofty and distant from the travails of the most difficult post in Tunisia politics.
Tunisia Premiers have since the 2011 revolution left behind carcasses of battered heads of government. All with varying degrees have failed to deliver the promised goods of development and even political stability. Plus, Ghannouchi has never tried his hand at civil service or government posts. A late-comer to executive politics at a time of political strife, Ghannouchi would face socio economic challenges that would swiftly end his career on a low note. Ghannouchi has never served in the civil service and what he would offer very little in terms of technocratic know-how for running the business of government. Perhaps better for Tunisia’s democratization would be Ghannouchi as a seasoned interlocutor politician, a moderator who may be needed to negotiate bargains that keep an entire country and democratic experiment on track.
Beyond the election ‘fetish’
All candidates for the presidency need to transcend the election fetish of turning Tunisia’s fledglingly durable democratization. Politicians need to find shared spaces to work in parallel, to contribute to democratic success, social success, and knowledge transfer. At the end of the day, even if Tunisia is democratic, it is still a poor country. It needs more than periodic elections. Here none of the candidates have offered convincing attempts to answer the most pressing question.
How can they harvest all the human and knowledge capital in the country to take advantage of the democratic moment?
Those looking for a leader to rekindle Tunisia’s revolutionary flame, and more importantly, its twin aims of huriyyah and karamah will be hard-pressed to find him or her among this year’s lineup. Instead, candidates clamor to prove their “stability” credentials, whether in Morou’s claim that he will be the “affectionate father” Tunisians are looking for, or Zbidi’s emphasis on strong states, which he extends so far as to pledge restoring full diplomatic ties with Damascus. Are we back to the all-too-familiar political discourse of patrimonialism? Whether or not such discourse still resonates with a (divided) public is for Tunisians to decide as they watch the upcoming televised presidential debates, a first in Tunisia and the Arab world, before they cast their ballots in mid-September.
For the first time in Tunisian history, will we see a quasi-deep state candidate (Zbidi) face off against an Islamist (Morou)? Stay tuned for more twists and turns. Nothing stays the same for long in Tunisia’s democratizing politics.
Larbi Sadiki is a Professor at International Affairs Department, Qatar University and a Non-Resident Scholar at Brookings Doha Centre
