Geoffrey Robertson
by Geoffrey Robertson
The latest Snowden document, revealed by Guardian Australia today, increases concern that the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) is operating outside its legal mandate. The minutes of a policy meeting in Britain in 2008, with their US, Canadian, UK and New Zealand counterparts, reveal DSD representatives claiming that they were entitled to share the confidential data of Australians with these partners, and were even considering disclosing them to “non-intelligence agencies” without first obtaining a warrant.
This would be a breach of sections 8 and 12 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001. Snowden’s evidence that DSD ignored this law (or was ignorant of its correct interpretation) raises the prospect that law-abiding Australians have had their personal data wrongfully collected and transmitted to bodies which may use it to damage them.
The Intelligence Services Act sets strict limits on any DSD (now ASD) activity “likely to have a direct effect on an Australian person or produce intelligence on an Australian person”. In such cases, ministerial authorisation is required (section 8) and before giving it, the minister must be satisfied that the Australian is “a person of interest” — ie involved in terrorism or espionage or serious crime. This is a vital safeguard and any unauthorised or unnecessary surveillance of an Australian is in breach of the Act (section 12).
The Snowden leak, however, suggests that in some circumstances DSD believes it can circumvent this safeguard and even offer up the fruit of its warrantless interceptions to foreign agencies.
In Australia there is a parliamentary committee on intelligence and security. But it can only review matters referred by a minister or by the houses of parliament — it cannot act on its own initiative to ensure that DSD is operating within the law. There is however an inspector general of intelligence and security, a position established by special legislation in 1986 who may of her own initiative “inquire into any matter that relates to the compliance by (DSD) with the laws of the Commonwealth… or the propriety of particular activities of the agency… or a practice of that agency that is or may be inconsistent with or contrary to any human right”.
The guardian who must now guard the DSD is the current inspector general Dr Vivienne Thom, a legal academic. So far she has remained silent on the Snowden revelations and as far as the public is aware, she has not investigated the organisation for privacy invasion or excess of power in respect of those allegations. If she hasn’t, she must do so urgently and immediately, or her office will not live up to its statutory duty. The answer to the Quis Custodiet question, in Australia, will be Nemo — nobody. THE GUARDIANby Geoffrey Robertson
The latest Snowden document, revealed by Guardian Australia today, increases concern that the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) is operating outside its legal mandate. The minutes of a policy meeting in Britain in 2008, with their US, Canadian, UK and New Zealand counterparts, reveal DSD representatives claiming that they were entitled to share the confidential data of Australians with these partners, and were even considering disclosing them to “non-intelligence agencies” without first obtaining a warrant.
This would be a breach of sections 8 and 12 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001. Snowden’s evidence that DSD ignored this law (or was ignorant of its correct interpretation) raises the prospect that law-abiding Australians have had their personal data wrongfully collected and transmitted to bodies which may use it to damage them.
The Intelligence Services Act sets strict limits on any DSD (now ASD) activity “likely to have a direct effect on an Australian person or produce intelligence on an Australian person”. In such cases, ministerial authorisation is required (section 8) and before giving it, the minister must be satisfied that the Australian is “a person of interest” — ie involved in terrorism or espionage or serious crime. This is a vital safeguard and any unauthorised or unnecessary surveillance of an Australian is in breach of the Act (section 12).
The Snowden leak, however, suggests that in some circumstances DSD believes it can circumvent this safeguard and even offer up the fruit of its warrantless interceptions to foreign agencies.
In Australia there is a parliamentary committee on intelligence and security. But it can only review matters referred by a minister or by the houses of parliament — it cannot act on its own initiative to ensure that DSD is operating within the law. There is however an inspector general of intelligence and security, a position established by special legislation in 1986 who may of her own initiative “inquire into any matter that relates to the compliance by (DSD) with the laws of the Commonwealth… or the propriety of particular activities of the agency… or a practice of that agency that is or may be inconsistent with or contrary to any human right”.
The guardian who must now guard the DSD is the current inspector general Dr Vivienne Thom, a legal academic. So far she has remained silent on the Snowden revelations and as far as the public is aware, she has not investigated the organisation for privacy invasion or excess of power in respect of those allegations. If she hasn’t, she must do so urgently and immediately, or her office will not live up to its statutory duty. The answer to the Quis Custodiet question, in Australia, will be Nemo — nobody. THE GUARDIAN
