Alejandro Hope
By Alejandro Hope
When Mexican marines recently captured Miguel Angel Trevino, the head of Los Zetas, the country’s most infamous and ruthless drug gang, Mexicans heard about it not from President Enrique Pena Nieto or one of his Cabinet officials, but from a spokesman at the Interior Ministry.
That low-key approach fits with the government’s effort to play down information about drugs and violence, and it has been rewarded with improved public perceptions about crime and security.
Yet this strategy is also fraught with risk. Pena Nieto’s administration is caught between saying so much that fear is reignited and saying so little that it appears insensitive to the very serious threats still facing many Mexicans.
Another threat is the potential public backlash if security doesn’t improve at a faster rate in coming months. Combined with slow economic growth, unmet expectations on the security front could undermine the government’s political standing.
In terms of reality, however, while Mexico’s fight against crime is moving in the right direction, it is doing so at a haltingly slow pace, much as it was a year ago. Pena Nieto seems to be following the script laid out by his predecessor, Felipe Calderon: Using the armed forces for policing; going after major kingpins; maintaining close, albeit more discreet, ties with US security agencies.
An ambitious reform of the criminal-justice system is proceeding unevenly: Some states have already completed the transition to a new oral and more open system, modelled somewhat on US lines (as opposed to a written, inquisitorial system in which most proceedings happen behind closed doors); others have barely started the necessary legal changes. Some states have created new, better-trained, better-paid, more honest police forces; most are still stuck with corrupt, unreliable, unprepared law-enforcement units.
Thus, Pena Nieto must find ways to accelerate the pacification of Mexico. There are two possibilities.
First, he could pursue the ethically unpalatable and potentially suicidal option of finding some accommodation with the drug gangs.
Second, he could try to accelerate institutional reform at the state and local levels. Given the weakness of most local security institutions, even relatively minor improvements can yield quick gains.
In the northern state of Nuevo Leon, for example, the creation of a new police force has led to a 50 percent decline in homicides and a 70 percent reduction in car thefts over the past year.
US economic assistance needs to be creatively leveraged if it is to be truly useful. At less than $300m a year, the Merida Initiative is too small to change the security equation at the national level, but it could potentially modulate the behaviour of local players.
In a broad pacification strategy, the Mexican government could complement institutional change with focused targeting of the most violent groups. The demolition of the Zetas provides a useful template: The government could warn other gangs, explicitly or tacitly, that they are next in line for the same treatment unless they reduce the violence.
In the long run, Mexico is likely to become more peaceful, particularly if structural reforms lead to stronger economic growth. A larger middle class will demand improved public services, including the police and the criminal-justice system.
However, that process is too far off in the future to be relevant to the current administration.
WP-BLOOMBERG
By Alejandro Hope
When Mexican marines recently captured Miguel Angel Trevino, the head of Los Zetas, the country’s most infamous and ruthless drug gang, Mexicans heard about it not from President Enrique Pena Nieto or one of his Cabinet officials, but from a spokesman at the Interior Ministry.
That low-key approach fits with the government’s effort to play down information about drugs and violence, and it has been rewarded with improved public perceptions about crime and security.
Yet this strategy is also fraught with risk. Pena Nieto’s administration is caught between saying so much that fear is reignited and saying so little that it appears insensitive to the very serious threats still facing many Mexicans.
Another threat is the potential public backlash if security doesn’t improve at a faster rate in coming months. Combined with slow economic growth, unmet expectations on the security front could undermine the government’s political standing.
In terms of reality, however, while Mexico’s fight against crime is moving in the right direction, it is doing so at a haltingly slow pace, much as it was a year ago. Pena Nieto seems to be following the script laid out by his predecessor, Felipe Calderon: Using the armed forces for policing; going after major kingpins; maintaining close, albeit more discreet, ties with US security agencies.
An ambitious reform of the criminal-justice system is proceeding unevenly: Some states have already completed the transition to a new oral and more open system, modelled somewhat on US lines (as opposed to a written, inquisitorial system in which most proceedings happen behind closed doors); others have barely started the necessary legal changes. Some states have created new, better-trained, better-paid, more honest police forces; most are still stuck with corrupt, unreliable, unprepared law-enforcement units.
Thus, Pena Nieto must find ways to accelerate the pacification of Mexico. There are two possibilities.
First, he could pursue the ethically unpalatable and potentially suicidal option of finding some accommodation with the drug gangs.
Second, he could try to accelerate institutional reform at the state and local levels. Given the weakness of most local security institutions, even relatively minor improvements can yield quick gains.
In the northern state of Nuevo Leon, for example, the creation of a new police force has led to a 50 percent decline in homicides and a 70 percent reduction in car thefts over the past year.
US economic assistance needs to be creatively leveraged if it is to be truly useful. At less than $300m a year, the Merida Initiative is too small to change the security equation at the national level, but it could potentially modulate the behaviour of local players.
In a broad pacification strategy, the Mexican government could complement institutional change with focused targeting of the most violent groups. The demolition of the Zetas provides a useful template: The government could warn other gangs, explicitly or tacitly, that they are next in line for the same treatment unless they reduce the violence.
In the long run, Mexico is likely to become more peaceful, particularly if structural reforms lead to stronger economic growth. A larger middle class will demand improved public services, including the police and the criminal-justice system.
However, that process is too far off in the future to be relevant to the current administration.
WP-BLOOMBERG
