Dr Mahjoob Zweiri
The US Intelligence Council issued an annual security assessment on the list of terrorist threats to US interests inside and outside the United States. This annual assessment usually is presented to the US Congress during a special session.
The Intelligence Council includes 17 agencies for security and intelligence in the United States, starting from the central intelligence service, the CIA, the multiple information collection units of the US Army, to the entities associated with the Department of Homeland Security.
They all operate to face any threats, either directed by countries, organisations or individuals. Therefore, the report contains the names of countries and organisations, and it also highlights the dangers of nuclear weapons, electronic crimes, terrorism, even drug and human trafficking.
The estimated budget allocated to these units in 2014 was more than $65bn. The 29-page security assessment for 2015 was remarkable this time as it ruled out Iran and Hezbollah from being threats to the United States. The question is: What are the causes and consequences for America to exclude both Hezbollah and Iran from their terror list?
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The report addresses the security assessment for the potential risks and threats to the United States of America during 2015. The evaluation of these threats and risks is based on various developments and data relating to 2014.
From here, the determination of this security assessment is heavily influenced by the variables of the previous year. This doesn’t necessarily negate the input of other data which is still active for long.
Out of that, the general developments in 2014 formulate a source of guidance that is essential to define the hazards likely to afflict the USA, particularly in relation to the hot zone area, such as the Middle East.
Iran was mentioned around 38 times in the report, while Hezbollah was mentioned once. The report has devoted a special section for Iran through which it wrote about the regional threats to the United States in the Middle East, where the report said that Tehran posed a threat to US interests through its actions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, describing Iran as the sponsor of “Shia governments.”
The report also shows Iran as a threat in terms of missile strength. In the same context, it positively talks about what it called “Iran’s cooperation with the international community” after the principle agreement that was reached by the 5+1 group with Iran in 2013 concerning the Iranian nuclear programme.
When mentioning Tehran, the report reflects the way Iran thinks, which is a matter that can probably be explained by observing the direct meetings between Washington and Tehran at multiple levels.
This direct communication did not occur in this manner and to such intensity before. This kind of understanding is very evident in the security assessment report for 2014, as well as 2013.
What draws our attention is the security assessment for 2015 where the US Intelligence Council excluded Iran and Hezbollah from their section on terrorism, while it included Iran and Hezbollah in all previous assessments.
Exclusion proof
As previously noted, the security assessment of the US intelligence Council for the coming year depends on the political developments and the available data relating to the previous year.
Given the developments in 2014 and the role played by Iran and Hezbollah in both Syria and Iraq — especially military expansion and assembly of multinational forces in addition to the support of the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah — excluding both of them was based on data gathered for Washington about the priority role of both Iran and Hezbollah.
It seems that Washington is aware that Iran’s regional preoccupation and its many political, military and media engagements, will not enable it to engage in any activities that Washington has previously labelled as acts of terrorism.
The Quds Force is the most prominent wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and Washington has indicated that it’s being threatened by their activities. Today, this Quds force is dramatically busy with what is happening in Syria and Iraq after the fall of Mosul at the hands of the Islamic State.
This data was not far from the direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran since 2012, which unavoidably gave a golden opportunity to Washington to see how the Iranian leadership is thinking regarding the regional political issues and to some extent understand the Iranian priorities in light of the rapid changes in the region.
The most prominent issue in this context is the real economic effect that Iran witnessed during the economic sanctions in the past few years, especially the UN and EU sanctions targeting the energy and financial sectors. The decline of oil prices came as a thunderbolt for the Iranian economy, which was suffering a lot because of these sanctions.
The decline in oil return in light of the expansion in various regional venues constitutes a drain on the Iranian progress. It’s not surprising that Iran asks Iraq to fund the Iranian troops and the advisers who are working to help the Iraqi army, as well as to finance some of Iranian military activities in Syria, before ISIS took control of the Iraqi city of Mosul.
In the security assessment of 2014 about the potential terrorist threats to the US interest, it was mentioned that both Iran and Hezbollah are part of this list, but the assessment report gave a general description that was not based on specific developments, unlike the security assessment in 2013, which cited Iran and Hezbollah in the context of two important events: a) what was attributed to Hezbollah when it targeted Israelis in Bulgaria in 2012, where five Israelis were killed in a bus,
b) what was attributed to Iran when it attempted the assassination of the Saudi Ambassador, Adel Al Jubeir, in Washington in 2011.
The two events together are a strong example to include Iran in the terrorist list for 2014, but it is interesting that the conclusion reached by the assessment is that Iran and Hezbollah didn’t want a direct confrontation with the United States, and that the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a prominent priority for keeping the political system in the country.
In this context, it seems very clear how Washington takes into account the threats that can touch its allies in its security assessment of terrorist threats toward US interests. This explains the mention of Iran and Hezbollah in the list of terrorist of 2013 and 2014.
What is next?
The exclusion of Iran and Hezbollah from the list of terrorist threats to US interests in 2015 doesn’t seem outwardly away from the context of the diplomatic rapprochement between Tehran and Washington since 2005, when security talks regarding the status of Baghdad began between the ambassadors of Washington and Tehran in Baghdad. But, at the same time, the short-term evaluation may be changed according to the data and the possibility of threat emergence linked in one way or another with Iran and Hezbollah. In the same context, it should not be an exaggeration when considering the agreement as a way to draw the two countries closer, or precisely change the American view of the Islamic republic. This is because the same Intelligence Council issued an assessment in 2007 on Iran’s nuclear programme, which alerted America’s allies, whether Israel or the Arabs. The assessment report spoke frankly that Tehran halted all nuclear activities of military nature since 2003.
However, the report didn’t lead to a convergence between the two countries as it didn’t stop the intelligence and intellectual wars between these two parties; or even threatening to use force against Tehran.
The diversity of sources of apprehension and lack of trust between the two countries cannot be resolved in the one-step policy between them. It requires a policy of simultaneous steps. Since 1997, Washington hasn’t been able to solve any problem with Tehran, especially with the deep-rooted problem of mutual perceptions between them.
Iran and Washington are aware that they head off together, in terms of a change of tactics and not a change of their strategies. This matter applies in regards with the nuclear programme negotiations, where Washington wants to reach nuclear agreement for the coming 10 years to test the credibility of the Islamic Republic’s regime.
Washington wanted to negotiate with Tehran when the disintegrated alliance that Tehran was backed by has collapsed. The alliance that included Syria whose political system is busy defending its survival, and the Islamic Resistance Movement, which has distanced itself from any role about what is happening in Syria, the matter which has led to the deterioration of relations with Tehran.
Coming to Hezbollah, it has changed its priorities of resistance to maintain the political system in Syria.
The exclusion of Iran and Hezbollah from the list of terrorist threats is pouring into the benefit of internal affairs of Iran. It is helping the regime even in the short-term to keep the image of the United States as an opposing player, and that the US does this compromise from its side which proves how Iran has been always true all the time.
The writer is an academician and expert on Iranian affairs.
