Why is China talking to the Taliban?
23 Jun 2013
By Andrew Small
Over the last year, China has been expanding its direct contacts with the Taliban and sounding them out on security issues that range from separatist groups in the Chinese region of Xinjiang to the protection of Chinese resource investments, according to interviews with officials and experts in Beijing, Washington, Kabul, Islamabad and Peshawar.
While Beijing would like to see the reconciliation talks succeed in preventing Afghanistan from falling back into civil war, it is not counting on their success, and thus is preparing to deal with whatever constellation of political forces emerges in Afghanistan after the United States withdraws.
In China’s dealings with the Taliban, the independence movement among China’s Uighur Muslim minority has always been its biggest concern.
In the late 1990s, Beijing worried that the Taliban government in Kabul was providing a haven for Uighur militants, who had fled Chinese crackdowns in Xinjiang and set up training camps in Afghanistan.
In meetings in December 2000 in Kandahar, the Taliban’s reclusive leader Mohammed Omar assured the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, that the Taliban would not “allow any group to use its territory to conduct any such operations” against China. In exchange, Omar sought two things from China: formal political recognition and protection from UN sanctions.
Neither side delivered satisfactory results. The Taliban did not expel Uighur militants from its territory. Though it prohibited them from operating their own camps, it allowed them to embed with other militant groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
At the same time, China moderated its stance at the UN Security Council to abstain on sanctions that targeted the Taliban and established trade links that would help mitigate their impact, but it didn’t use its veto power. Beijing deferred its decision on giving the Taliban diplomatic recognition, which Washington’s reaction to the 9/11 attacks soon made moot anyway.
The two sides, however, realised they could do business with each other.
The Taliban’s then-ambassador to Pakistan described his Chinese counterpart in Islamabad in the late 1990s as “the only one to maintain a good relationship” with the Taliban. In fact, China was signing economic deals in Kabul the very day of the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
Since then, China has forged a good working relationship with the Karzai government, without ever becoming too closely identified with it by the insurgency. Today, China’s priority remains ensuring that any territory under Taliban control won’t function as a base for Uighur militant groups. The small remaining band of Uighur fighters — perhaps as few as 40 men — are primarily located in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan, in remote territory under the influence of a commander with ties to both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. China has been seeking assurances that the sheltering of Uighurs will not take place on a larger scale in Afghanistan itself.
It also wants its multi-billion dollar investments in Afghanistan protected from Taliban attacks. Beijing’s largest economic project, the Aynak copper mine, is in territory with a strong presence of the Haqqani network, an insurgent group that is closely allied with the Taliban.
China’s dealings with the Islamist insurgents also hedge against the risk that the Taliban might decide to view Chinese citizens, investments, or even mainland China itself as a legitimate target. Militants blamed China for the Pakistani government’s 2007 decision to launch an assault on the Red Mosque, a pro-Taliban stronghold in Islamabad, and duly retaliated with a series of attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan.
Nonetheless, sources in Pakistan who have talked to the militant commanders say that senior Taliban leaders are keen not to alienate Beijing — they have enough enemies already.
The Afghan Taliban continues to see the benefit of close ties with one of the few countries that can restrain their sometimes-overbearing Pakistani sponsors.
As a result, according to Chinese sources who work closely with the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, Taliban interlocutors have provided the same reassurances to China that they gave in the past: they will not allow Afghanistan to be used as a base of attacks and want to develop economic relations with the Chinese. But these sources also say that Chinese officials remain apprehensive.
They doubt the Taliban’s capacity and willingness to deliver on its promises, particularly on the matter of safe havens for Uighur militants, and they fear a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would destabilise Pakistan and the region.
Beijing has therefore been increasingly keen to see a political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures a stable balance of power.
So will Beijing play a greater role in the upcoming peace talks among Kabul, the Taliban and the United States? Probably not. Despite tentative support from all three parties, Beijing has been deterred not only by its caution over involvement with a risky process but also by Islamabad.
While Beijing still treads carefully in its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, it knows it holds the upper hand, and is willing to exert pressure when important Chinese interests are at stake.
China prioritises stability in Afghanistan over sustaining Pakistani influence in the region; sources in Beijing who follow discussions between the two sides say that officials have made this increasingly clear to Islamabad.
In the 1990s, China paid little attention as Afghanistan slid into civil war and the Taliban seized control of the country. Now, with greater interests at stake, it doesn’t want to see the same story play out after the US withdrawal in 2014.
If history were to repeat itself, however, there are no prizes for guessing which country would be the first to send a business delegation to Kandahar after the Taliban’s return.
WP-BLOOMBERG
By Andrew Small
Over the last year, China has been expanding its direct contacts with the Taliban and sounding them out on security issues that range from separatist groups in the Chinese region of Xinjiang to the protection of Chinese resource investments, according to interviews with officials and experts in Beijing, Washington, Kabul, Islamabad and Peshawar.
While Beijing would like to see the reconciliation talks succeed in preventing Afghanistan from falling back into civil war, it is not counting on their success, and thus is preparing to deal with whatever constellation of political forces emerges in Afghanistan after the United States withdraws.
In China’s dealings with the Taliban, the independence movement among China’s Uighur Muslim minority has always been its biggest concern.
In the late 1990s, Beijing worried that the Taliban government in Kabul was providing a haven for Uighur militants, who had fled Chinese crackdowns in Xinjiang and set up training camps in Afghanistan.
In meetings in December 2000 in Kandahar, the Taliban’s reclusive leader Mohammed Omar assured the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin, that the Taliban would not “allow any group to use its territory to conduct any such operations” against China. In exchange, Omar sought two things from China: formal political recognition and protection from UN sanctions.
Neither side delivered satisfactory results. The Taliban did not expel Uighur militants from its territory. Though it prohibited them from operating their own camps, it allowed them to embed with other militant groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
At the same time, China moderated its stance at the UN Security Council to abstain on sanctions that targeted the Taliban and established trade links that would help mitigate their impact, but it didn’t use its veto power. Beijing deferred its decision on giving the Taliban diplomatic recognition, which Washington’s reaction to the 9/11 attacks soon made moot anyway.
The two sides, however, realised they could do business with each other.
The Taliban’s then-ambassador to Pakistan described his Chinese counterpart in Islamabad in the late 1990s as “the only one to maintain a good relationship” with the Taliban. In fact, China was signing economic deals in Kabul the very day of the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.
Since then, China has forged a good working relationship with the Karzai government, without ever becoming too closely identified with it by the insurgency. Today, China’s priority remains ensuring that any territory under Taliban control won’t function as a base for Uighur militant groups. The small remaining band of Uighur fighters — perhaps as few as 40 men — are primarily located in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan, in remote territory under the influence of a commander with ties to both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. China has been seeking assurances that the sheltering of Uighurs will not take place on a larger scale in Afghanistan itself.
It also wants its multi-billion dollar investments in Afghanistan protected from Taliban attacks. Beijing’s largest economic project, the Aynak copper mine, is in territory with a strong presence of the Haqqani network, an insurgent group that is closely allied with the Taliban.
China’s dealings with the Islamist insurgents also hedge against the risk that the Taliban might decide to view Chinese citizens, investments, or even mainland China itself as a legitimate target. Militants blamed China for the Pakistani government’s 2007 decision to launch an assault on the Red Mosque, a pro-Taliban stronghold in Islamabad, and duly retaliated with a series of attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan.
Nonetheless, sources in Pakistan who have talked to the militant commanders say that senior Taliban leaders are keen not to alienate Beijing — they have enough enemies already.
The Afghan Taliban continues to see the benefit of close ties with one of the few countries that can restrain their sometimes-overbearing Pakistani sponsors.
As a result, according to Chinese sources who work closely with the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, Taliban interlocutors have provided the same reassurances to China that they gave in the past: they will not allow Afghanistan to be used as a base of attacks and want to develop economic relations with the Chinese. But these sources also say that Chinese officials remain apprehensive.
They doubt the Taliban’s capacity and willingness to deliver on its promises, particularly on the matter of safe havens for Uighur militants, and they fear a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would destabilise Pakistan and the region.
Beijing has therefore been increasingly keen to see a political settlement in Afghanistan that ensures a stable balance of power.
So will Beijing play a greater role in the upcoming peace talks among Kabul, the Taliban and the United States? Probably not. Despite tentative support from all three parties, Beijing has been deterred not only by its caution over involvement with a risky process but also by Islamabad.
While Beijing still treads carefully in its bilateral relationship with Pakistan, it knows it holds the upper hand, and is willing to exert pressure when important Chinese interests are at stake.
China prioritises stability in Afghanistan over sustaining Pakistani influence in the region; sources in Beijing who follow discussions between the two sides say that officials have made this increasingly clear to Islamabad.
In the 1990s, China paid little attention as Afghanistan slid into civil war and the Taliban seized control of the country. Now, with greater interests at stake, it doesn’t want to see the same story play out after the US withdrawal in 2014.
If history were to repeat itself, however, there are no prizes for guessing which country would be the first to send a business delegation to Kandahar after the Taliban’s return.
WP-BLOOMBERG
