Dr Khalid Al Dakhil
There is a consensus that Operation Decisive Storm was launched days before the announcement of a framework nuclear deal between major powers and Iran in order to prevent its implications from affecting the Arabian peninsula and the countries of the region.
Why? For three reasons. First, the agreement prevents Iran from manufacturing nuclear weapons for 10 to 15 years. This span of time is sufficient to allow the Arab countries to develop their nuclear infrastructure and know-how, not only for peaceful use, but also to acquire the ability to manufacture a weapon, if needed.
The Arab countries could benefit from the Japanese, who have stopped just short of making a nuclear weapon. Japan is known as a nuclear threshold state. Of course, instead of this option, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states could accept a US nuclear umbrella.
However, this option is no longer available as it was more than three decades ago. Also, it will restrict the political freedom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and limit their ability to manoeuvre outside the framework of American interests.
The second reason is that the most dangerous threat posed by Iran is its sectarian project, as exemplified by the principle of creating alliances with political minorities and forming sectarian militias.
The coalition of minorities and the militias are the main levers of Iranian influence in the region. The threat posed by this project is visible in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. A threat, if allowed to grow, would endanger the rest of the countries, which would backfire on Iran.
Strangely, despite the fact that Iran is on the shores of the Arabian Gulf, the Gulf states were absent or not invited to the nuclear negotiations with Iran. This may have been due to political reasons.
The European Union, represented by Germany, is involved in the negotiations, so why not the Gulf? The Arab world could be represented by Saudi Arabia, for example?
This brings us back to the Iranian political project and the nuclear programme, which are opposed by Arab governments and people. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the two largest countries in the region, have not presented an alternative project to reveal the dangers of the Iranian project and its destructive sectarian nature.
The absence of an Arab project demonstrates lack of political reform. This weakens the Arab position because the conflict with Iran is in the final stage. Iran’s destructive project comprises cultural and political conflicts. When I mention Iran here, I just mean the Iranian regime, not that country’s people.
The theocratic regime is the source of sectarian projects. Hence there is need for an Arab project to oppose it. This need is imposed by the nature of current events. There is a need to develop military capabilities, either conventional or nuclear, so that Arab countries can counterbalance Iran.
This must happen within an economic and political programme based on a vision of developing the state as a civilian, democratic state.
Such a state will stand in direct opposition to the sectarian state represented by Iran. Developing the military capabilities of the state without this project is likely to end in militarisation of both the state and society, as happened with the Baath parties in Iraq and Syria.
The third reason lies in the vision of US President Barack Obama for a nuclear deal with Iran. This vision stems from a conviction based on three pieces of information.
The first is that Iran has acquired nuclear know-how that cannot be taken away. The second is that there is a national consensus in Iran on the necessity of a nuclear programme. Obama says that Iran’s acquisition of the technological know-how and the national consensus cancels the option of using military force to stop the programme.
Use of the military option would only delay Iran’s development of nuclear weapons by a few years. So the US president has settled on the option of negotiating rather than using military force.
According to the framework agreement, Iran’s nuclear programme will be slowed for 10 to 15 years. After that Iran will be free to manufacture nuclear weapons. What is the option after the agreement expires?
Here comes the third reason, embodied in America’s military superiority and the option of reimposing sanctions.
Obama pointed out that Iran’s military spending doesn’t exceed $30bn, while the US expenditure is close to $600bn.
Based on this, Obama said that America had nothing to fear from attempting a political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Obama’s vision involves an adventure. He believes that the lifting of sanctions, Iran’s return to the international system and the flow of foreign investment will lead to a fundamental change in Iran’s political system that will make Iran more interested in democracy, economic development and the welfare of its citizens rather than in an ideological struggle.
In other words, Obama is hoping that the nuclear deal will lead to a change in the Iranian political system from the inside out.
The president believes that the balance of power gives America the freedom to test his propositions. He didn’t take into account the concerns of the Arabs.
I don’t think Obama is to blame for that as much as Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf states and America’s Arab allies. Obama’s decision to reach an agreement with Iran indicates that the Arabs didn’t present to the US administration a convincing and comprehensive solution to the regional crises.
It may be that while highlighting the role of Iran in the crises they presented a vision for the future, but Obama chose to stick to his ideas because he doesn’t see an alternative to the status quo in the region, including the political behaviour of Iran. In any case, the main reason for the lack of harmony in the US and Arab positions is political.
It is either the political decision of a president ruling a superpower that imposes itself on everyone, or the political failure of its allies to provide an integrated and compelling vision.
The most dangerous thing about Obama’s vision for this agreement is not linked to the political behaviour of Iran. He has chosen to focus on the technical part of the agreement while letting political differences with Iran and the associated sanctions remain, especially those linked to its support for terrorism.
What is the Arab view on the agreement? There is no clear and coherent Arab view yet at the Arab League level or individually.
This confirms that there is no Arab strategy. Political and economic strategies, along with military capability, are among the elements of the balance of power between states.
If Obama chooses a technical agreement with Iran and maintains political differences, it would leave enough space for the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, to make a move.
They should take advantage of this space since the agreement shows that the US security umbrella can no longer be relied on. As a result of this umbrella, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries have remained outside the power equation in the region.
This has left Iran alone in the equation, especially after the fall of the Iraqi regime and the Syrian regime’s weakening. Saudi Arabia can no longer stay out of the equation.
In this context, Operation Decisive Storm will prevent Iran from interfering in the Arabian peninsula.
The fact that Saudi Arabia, which is not known to rush into things, is leading the coalition indicates the magnitude of the challenge posed by the agreement. Riyadh will not accept a repeat of the experiences of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in its neighbourhood.
Iran was taken by surprise by this move, which explains the convulsive reaction of its leadership. Saudi Arabia’s leadership of the coalition seems to indicate that it is convinced that staying outside the equation of territorial balance has exhausted its purpose and that after Iraq and Syria came under Iranian influence, it had to enter the equation directly.
This means that there will be a different approach to Saudi/Gulf security and a new political vision.
The question is, what is this vision? Operation Decisive Storm is the right move not only for the Gulf but for the Arab world as well. The war is a necessity because leaving the Houthis to complete their coup would mean Iranian intervention in another Arab country.
Since it is a political move, Decisive Storm shouldn’t be limited to direct military intervention; it should have a political dimension to counter Iran.
The author is an academic, a columnist and a political analyst
