Matthew Kroenig
By Matthew Kroenig
This week, President Obama gave a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, calling for the US and Russia to reduce the size of their deployed nuclear arsenals by one-third to around 1,000 strategic warheads. The call for further cuts has been greeted with enthusiasm in many quarters, but the proposed reductions could potentially be highly damaging to US interests. Obama argued that such cuts would be consistent with the goal of maintaining “a strong and credible strategic deterrent,” but the argument rests on a contested theory about how nuclear deterrence works.
The Obama administration, and many scholars and experts, believe that a secure, second-strike capability is sufficient for deterrence and anything more is “overkill.” They believe that nuclear warheads in excess of a “minimum deterrent” threshold can be cut with very little loss to the US security.
However, there are those who argue that maintaining a nuclear advantage over one’s opponents enhances deterrence. As Paul Nitze argued during the Cold War, it is of “the utmost importance that the West maintains a sufficient margin of superior capability. The greater the margin (and the more clearly the Communists understand that we have a margin), the less likely it is that nuclear war will ever occur.”
For decades, this debate was largely theoretical — neither camp marshalled systematic evidence in support of its views — but, recently, I reviewed the relationship between the size of a country’s nuclear arsenal and its ability to achieve its national security objectives. I found evidence that, when it comes to nuclear deterrence, more is better.
In an analysis of 52 countries that participated in nuclear crises from 1945 to 2001 (think of the Cuban Missile Crisis), I found that the state with the greater number of warheads is over 17 times more likely to achieve its goals. In addition, there is qualitative evidence from these crises that leaders in nuclear-armed states pay attention to the nuclear balance of power, they believe nuclear superiority enhances their position, and a nuclear advantage often translates directly into a geopolitical advantage.
Even if Russia agrees to match Obama’s proposed cuts, the reductions would attenuate US advantages vis-à-vis Russia and eat into the US margin of superiority against other nuclear-armed states, such as China, possibly increasing the likelihood that the US will be challenged militarily and reducing the probability that the US achieves its goals in future crises. If there is at least some reason to believe that reductions could harm America’s strategic deterrent, then certainly those in favour of reductions provide evidence that the benefits of reductions outweigh these costs, right? They don’t.
Supporters of further cuts argue that reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the US policy will help it stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
They argue that the large US nuclear arsenal makes it difficult (if not hypocritical) to tell, say, Iran that it cannot have nuclear weapons, or to demand that other non-nuclear countries (such as Brazil and Turkey) help the US pressure Iran. They argue that the US can generate goodwill and strengthen its nonproliferation efforts by cutting its nuclear arsenal.
This argument makes sense at a superficial level, but on closer inspection it falls apart. As Iran’s leaders decide whether to push forward with, or put limits on, their nuclear programme, or as Brazilian and Turkish leaders think about getting tougher with Iran, they likely consider many things, but it is implausible that the precise size of the US arsenal is among them. The evidence backs this logic up; the US has been cutting the size of its arsenal since 1967, but there is no reason to believe that it has received any credit for doing so, or that the cuts have contributed to any breakthroughs on important non-proliferation problems. In short, the US can’t stop other countries from building nuclear weapons by getting rid of its own.
Finally, proponents of cuts claim that nuclear reductions will lead to cost savings in a time of budget austerity, but, at least in the short term, nuclear reductions will result in cost increases.
Cutting arsenal size means pulling missiles out of silos, erecting buildings to store them, dismantling retired warheads, and decommissioning nuclear facilities. All of this costs money.
Only if the US thinks it can maintain a diminished nuclear posture indefinitely is it plausible to think there might be marginal cost savings over the long run. But this would be an unwise bet given that US competitors, including China, are moving in the opposite direction, expanding and modernising their nuclear forces. Since there are potential strategic costs and no identifiable benefits to further reducing the size of the US nuclear arsenal, the US should refrain from making any additional reductions.
It must not go below the 1,550 warheads agreed in New START (and it should take its sweet time getting down to that number). In addition, the US should maintain the “hedge” of weapons it keeps in reserve at current levels and halt the transfer of warheads from storage to retirement and elimination.
The Obama administration must follow through on its promise to fully invest in modernising nuclear infrastructure so that it does not lose the capability to sustain a safe, secure and effective arsenal for decades. Some may find this argument provocative, but it is quite anodyne; I recommend that the US maintain the status quo. What is provocative is slashing the US nuclear arsenal to 60-year lows in the face of evidence suggesting that doing so will harm its interests. WP-BLOOMBERG
By Matthew Kroenig
This week, President Obama gave a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, calling for the US and Russia to reduce the size of their deployed nuclear arsenals by one-third to around 1,000 strategic warheads. The call for further cuts has been greeted with enthusiasm in many quarters, but the proposed reductions could potentially be highly damaging to US interests. Obama argued that such cuts would be consistent with the goal of maintaining “a strong and credible strategic deterrent,” but the argument rests on a contested theory about how nuclear deterrence works.
The Obama administration, and many scholars and experts, believe that a secure, second-strike capability is sufficient for deterrence and anything more is “overkill.” They believe that nuclear warheads in excess of a “minimum deterrent” threshold can be cut with very little loss to the US security.
However, there are those who argue that maintaining a nuclear advantage over one’s opponents enhances deterrence. As Paul Nitze argued during the Cold War, it is of “the utmost importance that the West maintains a sufficient margin of superior capability. The greater the margin (and the more clearly the Communists understand that we have a margin), the less likely it is that nuclear war will ever occur.”
For decades, this debate was largely theoretical — neither camp marshalled systematic evidence in support of its views — but, recently, I reviewed the relationship between the size of a country’s nuclear arsenal and its ability to achieve its national security objectives. I found evidence that, when it comes to nuclear deterrence, more is better.
In an analysis of 52 countries that participated in nuclear crises from 1945 to 2001 (think of the Cuban Missile Crisis), I found that the state with the greater number of warheads is over 17 times more likely to achieve its goals. In addition, there is qualitative evidence from these crises that leaders in nuclear-armed states pay attention to the nuclear balance of power, they believe nuclear superiority enhances their position, and a nuclear advantage often translates directly into a geopolitical advantage.
Even if Russia agrees to match Obama’s proposed cuts, the reductions would attenuate US advantages vis-à-vis Russia and eat into the US margin of superiority against other nuclear-armed states, such as China, possibly increasing the likelihood that the US will be challenged militarily and reducing the probability that the US achieves its goals in future crises. If there is at least some reason to believe that reductions could harm America’s strategic deterrent, then certainly those in favour of reductions provide evidence that the benefits of reductions outweigh these costs, right? They don’t.
Supporters of further cuts argue that reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the US policy will help it stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
They argue that the large US nuclear arsenal makes it difficult (if not hypocritical) to tell, say, Iran that it cannot have nuclear weapons, or to demand that other non-nuclear countries (such as Brazil and Turkey) help the US pressure Iran. They argue that the US can generate goodwill and strengthen its nonproliferation efforts by cutting its nuclear arsenal.
This argument makes sense at a superficial level, but on closer inspection it falls apart. As Iran’s leaders decide whether to push forward with, or put limits on, their nuclear programme, or as Brazilian and Turkish leaders think about getting tougher with Iran, they likely consider many things, but it is implausible that the precise size of the US arsenal is among them. The evidence backs this logic up; the US has been cutting the size of its arsenal since 1967, but there is no reason to believe that it has received any credit for doing so, or that the cuts have contributed to any breakthroughs on important non-proliferation problems. In short, the US can’t stop other countries from building nuclear weapons by getting rid of its own.
Finally, proponents of cuts claim that nuclear reductions will lead to cost savings in a time of budget austerity, but, at least in the short term, nuclear reductions will result in cost increases.
Cutting arsenal size means pulling missiles out of silos, erecting buildings to store them, dismantling retired warheads, and decommissioning nuclear facilities. All of this costs money.
Only if the US thinks it can maintain a diminished nuclear posture indefinitely is it plausible to think there might be marginal cost savings over the long run. But this would be an unwise bet given that US competitors, including China, are moving in the opposite direction, expanding and modernising their nuclear forces. Since there are potential strategic costs and no identifiable benefits to further reducing the size of the US nuclear arsenal, the US should refrain from making any additional reductions.
It must not go below the 1,550 warheads agreed in New START (and it should take its sweet time getting down to that number). In addition, the US should maintain the “hedge” of weapons it keeps in reserve at current levels and halt the transfer of warheads from storage to retirement and elimination.
The Obama administration must follow through on its promise to fully invest in modernising nuclear infrastructure so that it does not lose the capability to sustain a safe, secure and effective arsenal for decades. Some may find this argument provocative, but it is quite anodyne; I recommend that the US maintain the status quo. What is provocative is slashing the US nuclear arsenal to 60-year lows in the face of evidence suggesting that doing so will harm its interests. WP-BLOOMBERG
