Fred Kaplan
By Fred Kaplan
Is the crisis in Ukraine over or just beginning? The answer depends on what Vladimir Putin wants and what the West does next. Did Putin want nothing more than to seize Crimea, to turn Russia’s control of the republic from de facto to de jure — or does he want to creep deeper into southern and eastern Ukraine on the pretext of “fraternal assistance” to ethnic Russians?
Two things should be understood. First, Putin’s actions have been driven less by a belief that the West is weak than his knowledge that Russia is. Second, he dreams of restoring Russia’s empire — his March 18 Kremlin speech is a cry of resentment against the West for its humiliation of his country during the early years after the Soviet Union’s collapse. A bitter autocrat with a head full of grandiose daydreams can be a dangerous creature.
This crisis began when Putin took notice that Ukraine — which he and every other Russian leader in history have regarded as deeply tied to Russia — was drifting into the West’s orbit. Then-president Viktor Yanukovich had taken steps towards an affiliation with the EU. Putin feared that this development could wreck his plans for a “Eurasian Union” (which he saw as the basis for a revived Russian empire), and offered Yanukovich $15bn for backing out of the Western league. Yanukovich took the bribe. Demonstrations broke out in Kiev, prompting crackdowns, a widening of the protests and the rest, we all know.
Lawrence Freedman, the scholar of strategy, has a blog post this week in “War on the Rocks,” noting the “basic challenge of crisis management is to protect core interests while avoiding major war.” Part of this challenge, he adds, involves “a sense of knowing when to exercise restraints and respect limits,” and “a grasp of what the adversary needs to enable it to de-escalate or to desist from further escalation.”
The first step to take in following this idea — a step that pundits and politicians have skipped — is to define what our “core interests” are. Crimea is not a core interest to the US or the West; it is a core interest to Russia. Cold as it may seem to say, Crimea is gone; there’s nothing we can do to get it back, and we — however you define “we” — never had it to begin with.
The forcible annexation of Crimea violated international law. It broke the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia, the US, and the UK, which — while it didn’t have the binding effect of the North Atlantic Treaty that established Nato — offered Ukraine security assurances in exchange for giving up the 2,000 nuclear weapons left in its territory as a remnant of Soviet days.
It’s worth getting upset about the seizure of Crimea. The things that President Barack Obama and the EU have done — relatively mild sanctions, the exclusion of Russia from an upcoming G7 (formerly G8) meeting, the shoring up of defences in Poland and the Baltic nations, and presumably more actions to come — are proportional steps worth taking. But no one should suffer the illusion that any of this will prod Putin to send troops in Crimea home (most were already stationed there) or give the land back to Ukraine. To pretend that it might — as some of Obama’s rhetoric about “costs” and “consequences” has implied — works only to Putin’s benefit; it makes him seem stronger (he’s withstood the US sanctions!) than he really is. If Putin starts moving troops into southern and eastern Ukraine, the story changes. It doesn’t change so drastically as some contend. Ukraine is not a member of Nato, and for good reason.
If Putin made further incursions, it would be a sign that he was acting on his dreams of revivified empire, trying to make them come true. He must be resisted, not for the sake of Ukraine but for the stability of Europe and the preservation of what little orderliness there is in the world. For if Russia can get away with chopping up Ukraine, in the heart of what was once hoped to be a united Europe, then other leaders who crave neighbours’ land might be emboldened to act on their dreams. American warnings — perhaps the deterrent power of the US military generally — would lose all potency. So the main goal of the US, the EU, and Nato should be to deter and dissuade Putin from moving his troops deeper into Ukraine. There are two ways to do this, seemingly contradictory but actually (if well-managed) complementary. First, ratchet up penalties. Second, leave room for diplomacy.
Penalties should include stepping up military deployments to the Nato allies, especially to Poland and the Baltic nations, which were once tied to the Soviet Union. Another: Draw up plans for containing and countering Russian troops in the event of an incursion into Ukraine — not sending US or Nato troops, but shipping arms, maybe some advisers and black-bag Delta forces — and talk about these plans with the allies, and Ukrainian officials, on open phone lines. Putin knows the limits of his army. The ground forces in that sector of Russia could invade Ukraine, but lack resources and logistical lines to sustain an occupation for long, especially in the event of even slight resistance. We have to make him realise we know these limitations.
Over those same unencrypted phone lines, a senior official should also talk about moves that would isolate Russia from the rest of the world — cutting it off from all international forums (Putin wants to be respected as a major world figure), freezing out not just a couple dozen Kremlin cronies but Russian banks and corporations.
These are threats of actions to take place if Russia goes deeper into Ukraine — not reprisals for the seizure of Crimea, which would have no effect and probably wouldn’t be enforced anyway.
Plans should be drawn up to flood Ukraine with Western money. Putin knows the Warsaw Pact nations that joined the EU are better off than those that didn’t. Freedman says that, in 1990, just before the implosion of the Soviet Union, Poland’s GDP amounted to $64.5bn and Ukraine’s at $90.2bn.
In 2012 Poland’s had skyrocketed to $489.9bn, while Ukraine’s was much worse at $176.3bn. Make plans to turn Ukraine into another showcase — another way of demonstrating to Russia’s thinning gang of allies that they’ve chosen the wrong side.
At the same time, the road to reconciliation shouldn’t be cut off. (Even after Nikita Khrushchev sent nuclear-tipped missiles to Cuba, John F Kennedy kept looking for face-saving ways to back down.) It’s worth keeping in mind that this crisis — a mere spat compared with the one over missiles in Cuba — is about getting Ukraine in a good, or passably decent, place.
As Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have acknowledged, Ukraine will always have ties with Russia, regardless of who is in the Kremlin. As the flip side of threats to step up the pressure if Putin moves deeper into Ukraine, Obama should assure him that he won’t lose Ukraine if he steps back.
Putin grew up in a culture of conspiracy — by which I mean not just the KGB but Russia. He has publicly said that the West orchestrated the recent protests in Kiev, that the Orange Revolution was an outright American plot, that the CIA is constantly seeking ways to undermine Russia’s political system and its network of allies — and he probably believes what he’s saying.
What’s going on is not Cold War II. The Cold War split the entire world in two factions. Scads of civil wars, regional wars, and wars of national liberation were, in some sense, “proxy wars” in the titanic struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. China was used as a lever for playing one side off the other — and China played off both.
Nothing like it could possibly go on now. Neither side has the leverage to do it. Russia has no global reach whatsoever. Russia has no support for its actions in Ukraine; China has evinced no interest in it. Right now, then, this is at most a regional conflict, not a global one, and the best thing that Obama can do — in both his threats and his inducements — is to keep it that way. Certain Republicans on Capitol Hill could help. Senators like John McCain, R-Ariz, and Lindsey Graham, R-SC, who used to know better, could lay off their absurd yelping about Obama’s “weakness” and “feckless leadership.” For one thing, it’s not true; at least when it comes to this crisis, they’ve recommended very few steps that Obama hasn’t already taken. If they’re worried about Putin’s perceptions of America, instead of merely clamouring to make political points with GOP extremists, they should stand by the president and make sure Putin understands that, on this issue, there are no domestic fissures for him to exploit.
WP-Bloomberg
By Fred Kaplan
Is the crisis in Ukraine over or just beginning? The answer depends on what Vladimir Putin wants and what the West does next. Did Putin want nothing more than to seize Crimea, to turn Russia’s control of the republic from de facto to de jure — or does he want to creep deeper into southern and eastern Ukraine on the pretext of “fraternal assistance” to ethnic Russians?
Two things should be understood. First, Putin’s actions have been driven less by a belief that the West is weak than his knowledge that Russia is. Second, he dreams of restoring Russia’s empire — his March 18 Kremlin speech is a cry of resentment against the West for its humiliation of his country during the early years after the Soviet Union’s collapse. A bitter autocrat with a head full of grandiose daydreams can be a dangerous creature.
This crisis began when Putin took notice that Ukraine — which he and every other Russian leader in history have regarded as deeply tied to Russia — was drifting into the West’s orbit. Then-president Viktor Yanukovich had taken steps towards an affiliation with the EU. Putin feared that this development could wreck his plans for a “Eurasian Union” (which he saw as the basis for a revived Russian empire), and offered Yanukovich $15bn for backing out of the Western league. Yanukovich took the bribe. Demonstrations broke out in Kiev, prompting crackdowns, a widening of the protests and the rest, we all know.
Lawrence Freedman, the scholar of strategy, has a blog post this week in “War on the Rocks,” noting the “basic challenge of crisis management is to protect core interests while avoiding major war.” Part of this challenge, he adds, involves “a sense of knowing when to exercise restraints and respect limits,” and “a grasp of what the adversary needs to enable it to de-escalate or to desist from further escalation.”
The first step to take in following this idea — a step that pundits and politicians have skipped — is to define what our “core interests” are. Crimea is not a core interest to the US or the West; it is a core interest to Russia. Cold as it may seem to say, Crimea is gone; there’s nothing we can do to get it back, and we — however you define “we” — never had it to begin with.
The forcible annexation of Crimea violated international law. It broke the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia, the US, and the UK, which — while it didn’t have the binding effect of the North Atlantic Treaty that established Nato — offered Ukraine security assurances in exchange for giving up the 2,000 nuclear weapons left in its territory as a remnant of Soviet days.
It’s worth getting upset about the seizure of Crimea. The things that President Barack Obama and the EU have done — relatively mild sanctions, the exclusion of Russia from an upcoming G7 (formerly G8) meeting, the shoring up of defences in Poland and the Baltic nations, and presumably more actions to come — are proportional steps worth taking. But no one should suffer the illusion that any of this will prod Putin to send troops in Crimea home (most were already stationed there) or give the land back to Ukraine. To pretend that it might — as some of Obama’s rhetoric about “costs” and “consequences” has implied — works only to Putin’s benefit; it makes him seem stronger (he’s withstood the US sanctions!) than he really is. If Putin starts moving troops into southern and eastern Ukraine, the story changes. It doesn’t change so drastically as some contend. Ukraine is not a member of Nato, and for good reason.
If Putin made further incursions, it would be a sign that he was acting on his dreams of revivified empire, trying to make them come true. He must be resisted, not for the sake of Ukraine but for the stability of Europe and the preservation of what little orderliness there is in the world. For if Russia can get away with chopping up Ukraine, in the heart of what was once hoped to be a united Europe, then other leaders who crave neighbours’ land might be emboldened to act on their dreams. American warnings — perhaps the deterrent power of the US military generally — would lose all potency. So the main goal of the US, the EU, and Nato should be to deter and dissuade Putin from moving his troops deeper into Ukraine. There are two ways to do this, seemingly contradictory but actually (if well-managed) complementary. First, ratchet up penalties. Second, leave room for diplomacy.
Penalties should include stepping up military deployments to the Nato allies, especially to Poland and the Baltic nations, which were once tied to the Soviet Union. Another: Draw up plans for containing and countering Russian troops in the event of an incursion into Ukraine — not sending US or Nato troops, but shipping arms, maybe some advisers and black-bag Delta forces — and talk about these plans with the allies, and Ukrainian officials, on open phone lines. Putin knows the limits of his army. The ground forces in that sector of Russia could invade Ukraine, but lack resources and logistical lines to sustain an occupation for long, especially in the event of even slight resistance. We have to make him realise we know these limitations.
Over those same unencrypted phone lines, a senior official should also talk about moves that would isolate Russia from the rest of the world — cutting it off from all international forums (Putin wants to be respected as a major world figure), freezing out not just a couple dozen Kremlin cronies but Russian banks and corporations.
These are threats of actions to take place if Russia goes deeper into Ukraine — not reprisals for the seizure of Crimea, which would have no effect and probably wouldn’t be enforced anyway.
Plans should be drawn up to flood Ukraine with Western money. Putin knows the Warsaw Pact nations that joined the EU are better off than those that didn’t. Freedman says that, in 1990, just before the implosion of the Soviet Union, Poland’s GDP amounted to $64.5bn and Ukraine’s at $90.2bn.
In 2012 Poland’s had skyrocketed to $489.9bn, while Ukraine’s was much worse at $176.3bn. Make plans to turn Ukraine into another showcase — another way of demonstrating to Russia’s thinning gang of allies that they’ve chosen the wrong side.
At the same time, the road to reconciliation shouldn’t be cut off. (Even after Nikita Khrushchev sent nuclear-tipped missiles to Cuba, John F Kennedy kept looking for face-saving ways to back down.) It’s worth keeping in mind that this crisis — a mere spat compared with the one over missiles in Cuba — is about getting Ukraine in a good, or passably decent, place.
As Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have acknowledged, Ukraine will always have ties with Russia, regardless of who is in the Kremlin. As the flip side of threats to step up the pressure if Putin moves deeper into Ukraine, Obama should assure him that he won’t lose Ukraine if he steps back.
Putin grew up in a culture of conspiracy — by which I mean not just the KGB but Russia. He has publicly said that the West orchestrated the recent protests in Kiev, that the Orange Revolution was an outright American plot, that the CIA is constantly seeking ways to undermine Russia’s political system and its network of allies — and he probably believes what he’s saying.
What’s going on is not Cold War II. The Cold War split the entire world in two factions. Scads of civil wars, regional wars, and wars of national liberation were, in some sense, “proxy wars” in the titanic struggle between the US and the Soviet Union. China was used as a lever for playing one side off the other — and China played off both.
Nothing like it could possibly go on now. Neither side has the leverage to do it. Russia has no global reach whatsoever. Russia has no support for its actions in Ukraine; China has evinced no interest in it. Right now, then, this is at most a regional conflict, not a global one, and the best thing that Obama can do — in both his threats and his inducements — is to keep it that way. Certain Republicans on Capitol Hill could help. Senators like John McCain, R-Ariz, and Lindsey Graham, R-SC, who used to know better, could lay off their absurd yelping about Obama’s “weakness” and “feckless leadership.” For one thing, it’s not true; at least when it comes to this crisis, they’ve recommended very few steps that Obama hasn’t already taken. If they’re worried about Putin’s perceptions of America, instead of merely clamouring to make political points with GOP extremists, they should stand by the president and make sure Putin understands that, on this issue, there are no domestic fissures for him to exploit.
WP-Bloomberg
