President Hadi
Iran seems to be more compromising than before on its nuclear programme. What brought Iran to this point?
There are several factors that have converged. First of all, we have a new leadership in Iran. I think this afforded an opportunity to the Iranian state to rethink its strategy toward its nuclear programme. The coming to office of President Rowhani and the group he was able to bring to his cabinet, in particular Foreign Minister (Mohammad Javad) Zarif… These are the people who have a very different approach towards Iran’s engagement with the outside world. They believe that Iran’s approach to the nuclear programme was hurting the country’s national interests. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet had a very different approach. They thought that if they made any compromises, it would undermine their legitimacy because they had built their legitimacy on the whole notion of “resisting pressure” from the US and European Union (EU). Whereas Rowhani and Zarif have a slightly different approach, which is that this uncompromising stance in relation to the US and EU undermines Iranian interests. The other factor is that the sanctions were beginning to have a dramatic effect on the lives of average, middle-class Iranians. They had serious consequences. This is another factor that compelled the Iranians to go to the negotiation table.
Do you see any change in the US policy towards Iran’s nuclear programme?
Clearly the Americans have decided to slow down the pace of enrichment. They have decided not only to slow down the pace but also to lower the quantity, so that the Iranians scale back and reduce the number of centrifuges. This was a critical issue for the US and the EU in ensuring that Iran doesn’t reach the threshold of what is called a “breakout capacity”. First, the Iranians were accused of wanting a nuclear bomb, then the US revised its position and said that Iran doesn’t want a nuclear bomb but wants the technology to build a nuclear bomb; to reach a stage where it can build a nuclear bomb in two to three months. They won’t have it, but they will have the knowledge. Based on this framework, Iran’s breakout capacity, its ability to build a nuclear bomb, has supposedly been pushed back to one year. Now there has been a qualitative change to the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. It has a much smaller scale compared to before. Now it would take Iran longer to put together a nuclear bomb, if it wants to have one.
Is everybody in Iran on the same page about the nuclear deal? Are there dissenting voices?
There is a very robust discussion in Iran about the deal. Within the state, there has been a very vibrant debate. One of the things that Rowhani has been able to do is to put together a consensus among different groups that have agreed on the parameters of a deal with America. These groups include Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali) Khamenei, the Iranian parliament (majlis), the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), known as the armed forces, and, of course, they also include technocrats; people in the civil service, the bureaucracy, and key decision-makers. It is the genius of Rowhani that he has put together this consensus, everybody being on the same page. If you look at the Ahmadinejad administration, the parliament was always fighting with him. But the parliament has not fought with Rowhani on the nuclear issue. The IRGC has not criticised the deal. In fact, they have congratulated Rowhani on the deal. The deputy speaker of the majlis has endorsed the deal. This is a very tenuous consensus. If the deal falls through, if the Americans do not lift the sanctions, if something goes wrong between now and June, then I think Rowhani’s group will break apart. They are going to say, “what is in it for us? We agreed to give up, and we are not getting anything in return.” Right now, the different groups are on the same page. The question is will they remain on the same page as the final deal is reached?
The Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, have expressed serious concerns about the deal. Do they have good reasons to be worried?
Initially, Saudi Arabia expressed serious concerns because it was concerned that any Iran-US rapprochement would be at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s close relations with the US. Then, a week after the initial framework was signed, the Saudis came out and endorsed it, simply because they didn’t want to be seen as opposing something that was a done deal. Now the only country that opposes the deal is Israel.
The Gulf states, since 1979, have capitalised on tensions between the US and Iran. The more Iran and the US had tensions, countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were able to tell the West, “Look at us. We are the reasonable actors in regional politics.” Now, if Iran is accepted back into the global community, the Gulf states are worried that it might lessen their leverage. Therefore it behoves the Americans and Iranians to convince these Gulf states that this is a win-win scenario, not a zero-sum scenario.
What do you make of Saudi Arabia’s recent military intervention in Yemen?
Saudi Arabia’s recent engagement in Yemen is the product of several short- and long-term developments. If we go back about a year and a half, we see that because of its worries about the Iran-US rapprochement, about developments in Syria, about the emergence and growth of IS, it has had a foreign policy that has been often quick, even impulsive and reactive, sometimes a little too hasty in their actions. For instance, breaking relations with Qatar, pulling back the ambassadors, sending them back, refusing their seat at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, refusing to deliver the annual speech before the UN General Assembly. These are longer term indications of policy indecision in the Saudi foreign policy establishment. In the meanwhile, you had a leadership change in Saudi Arabia, in which both the king and defence minister are younger. I think Saudi bombardment in Yemen needs to be placed in the context of a broader Saudi foreign policy conduct over the last two years. For Yemen, I believe the Saudis have acted very hastily, they don’t seem to have a long-term exit strategy, or a morning after strategy. Well, you bomb, but then what? They have been extremely surprised to find that Pakistan is not becoming part of it. Because ultimately you can only bomb the country from the air, but you need boots on the ground. The Saudis are now trying to figure out what their next move should be in terms of troops on the ground. And once the troops are on the ground you begin to see casualties, and once you begin to see casualties, the real cost of Saudi action in Yemen is felt.
Why is Iran interfering in other countries’ internal affairs?
Iran has an active presence in Iraq and Syria. But so does Qatar, so does Saudi Arabia, so do many other counties. When you have conditions in which central authority is weak, as in Baghdad and Damascus, you have other actors that become involved; either directly, or indirectly. Right now in Iraq and Syria we have a situation in which multiple actors are involved, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey. They are all trying to further their own interests and Iran is no exception. I think it would be misleading and disingenuous to say that Iran is active in Syria. Yes Iran is active in Syria but so is Saudi Arabia. One of the reasons that Iran is active in Syria is that others are active.
It is also disingenuous to say that Iran is involved in Yemen. Saudi Arabia has been the dominant force in Yemen at least since the 1990s, and of course before. Much of the reason why Yemen is in a mess today is non-stop Saudi interference going back to the 1960s. If you go back to the 1960s, Yemen’s earliest civil war, the other countries involved were Egypt, helping the so-called revolutionaries, and Saudi Arabia, helping more conservative forces in Yemen. When you have this kind of regional competition, of course Iran also becomes involved. The other thing is, to say that the Houthis are stooges of Iran does not do justice to the depth of resentment that the Houthis feel for the way they are treated by President Hadi. It also reduces the developments to very simplistic assumptions. For a long time, former president Saleh was supported by Saudi Arabia. Now Saleh is in cohorts with the Houthis. So saying that Iran is interfering is incomplete and misleading, because the Saudis have long been involved and now they are bombing the country.
Do you see a sectarian conflict in the region? If yes, how is Iran contributing to this?
I see a strategic conflict in the region, a power conflict, among different regional actors. And I think the chaos that has been pervasive in the Middle East since 2011 has provided a perfect opportunity for these regional actors to compete. This strategic conflict sometimes assumes a sectarian flavour. But the root of it is not sectarian. Four or five years ago, we were not talking about Shia-Sunni, we were talking about regional competition, governments competing with each other; we were talking about Iran and its collaboration with Hamas, and Hamas is not Shia. But then regional competition became reconfigured in different ways. In the meanwhile, you had people who might be called sectarian, or they are called ‘identity entrepreneurs.” You had sectarian individuals that in order to enhance their own legitimacy, in order to empower themselves, started playing the sectarian card. It really started in Bahrain, where you had a national revolution that was framed by the state in sectarian terms. When that happened, sectarianism became a convenient political tool. Then in many ways the conflicts in the region became voiced in sectarian terms.
Some surveys suggest that the Gulf Arabs find Iran more threatening than Israel. Is this surprising to you?
Fear is the result of a prevalent narrative. At a time when you have Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Al Sharq Al Awsat, the media in general, and clerics who on Fridays deliver increasingly more sectarian and anti-Shia sermons, then of course that begins to have an impact on the general population. I am not surprised about this perception of Iran, given the fact that the media and the clerics have become increasingly sectarian and anti-Shia in their representation. For example, you never hear the Houthis referred to by the name by which they call themselves, which is Ansar Allah. You hear ‘the Houthis’, and it is always ‘Iranian-backed Houthis’. Within this context of a prevailing narrative, I don’t think it is surprising that public opinion polls reflect a greater fear of Iran as compared to Israel.THE PENINSULA
