Yousaf Butt
By Yousaf Butt
President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin are expected to discuss missile defence, their thorniest bilateral problem, at the G8 summit being held in Ireland. Previous talks between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) have floundered over the alliance’s refusal to give Moscow legal guarantees that the system would not undermine Russian nuclear forces.
But the diplomatic dance around missile defence cooperation has always been like Kabuki theatre — with officials playing out their designated roles. There is only the illusion of real engagement.
To allay Moscow’s concerns, Washington has invited Russia to participate in the defensive system, helping Nato guard against Iran. But Moscow is unlikely to cooperate on a flawed system against a threat it doesn’t see as imminent.
So during this conference at Lough Erne Resort in Northern Ireland expect to see more luncheons, talks and coffee breaks. But don’t expect anything of military significance to happen. Which is for the best.
Missile defence cooperation between Nato and Russia could produce serious blowback. An alienated China may build up its nuclear arms, and create a domino effect — with both India and Pakistan shoring up their nuclear arsenals in response.
The irony of the entire charade is that the Nato system is known to have serious technological flaws and has never been scientifically tested. Why would Russia want to cooperate on an expensive system that does not work — especially against a threat from Iran and North Korea, which Russia discounts?
The defensive system is designed to intercept enemy warheads in the “midcourse” phase — after launch and before reentry — several hundred kilometres up in space. The big problem, however, is that such a system can be easily short-circuited and rendered toothless.
Missile defence, the scientists point out, is “predicated on the ability to discriminate” real warheads from other targets, “such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware and intentional countermeasures.”
If “the defence should find itself in a situation where it is shooting at missile junk or decoys, the impact on the regional interceptor inventory would be dramatic and devastating!”
So Nato’s interceptor inventory would be exhausted in chasing decoy warheads. For the system still has this fundamental architectural flaw.
How did an untested and unworkable technology make it so far in the Defence Department procurement process? A recent Government Accountability Office report reveals that instead of flying before buying, the Missile Defence Agency has been doing the opposite. Its cart-before-the-horse methodology has resulted in “unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, test problems, and performance shortfalls.”
The agency’s “tests” are more like rigged “demonstrations.” The intercept team knows all the incoming missile’s parameters ahead of time — a luxury it won’t have during a real attack. Even with this, however, many “demonstrations” ended in dismal failure.
So, the question is: If Iran or North Korea could so easily circumvent this vaunted missile defence system, why are the Russians (and Chinese) so up in arms against it?
But the Russians have political as well as scientific concerns. The House Republicans, in particular, are creating diplomatic problems. The Chinese, because of their smaller nuclear arsenal, have also been concerned about the expanding ship-based missile defence system. They fear it may be used to neutralise some of their deterrent forces.
These stockpile increases will likely pressure India, and, in turn, Pakistan to also ramp up their nuclear weapon arsenals.
So Russian and Chinese fears that the US missile defence system has been developed to counter their strategic arsenals are being legitimised by these congressional legislators’ actions and statements.
What should we expect if — by some miracle — Russia and Nato reach an agreement on missile defence cooperation?
Aside from being a waste of Russian taxpayers’ money, it is almost certain that China would react with alarm to such a development. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission suggested, China would likely increase its nuclear arsenal at an accelerated pace.
Missile defence strengthens the hands of over-cautious, misinformed, opportunistic or hawkish elements within the Iranian and North Korean political and military establishments — as well as hardliners in Moscow and Beijing.
This interplay between unknown future capabilities and intentions, as well as domestic pressures for Moscow and Beijing to respond to Nato missile defences would likely increase military expenditures and nuclear arms deployment.
So the central conundrum of midcourse missile defence remains that while it creates incentives for US adversaries and competitors to increase their nuclear stockpiles, it offers no credible protection for the US or its allies.
Instead of focusing on this system, if Washington genuinely wants to achieve some new diplomatic breakthrough during the G8 meeting in Northern Ireland, it could focus on realistic mutual threats.
For example, a US-Russian plan to address the real threat from asteroids. Cooperating on this could indeed bring about rapprochement and goodwill.
Many in the policy community — even those who favor arms control — are advocating for Russia-Nato missile defence cooperation. But why should we expect Moscow to play nice and cooperate on an expensive and dysfunctional system?
Moscow and Washington should reaffirm that they will pare down their bloated nuclear arsenals unilaterally — regardless of how the flawed Nato missile defence plan develops. REUTERS
By Yousaf Butt
President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin are expected to discuss missile defence, their thorniest bilateral problem, at the G8 summit being held in Ireland. Previous talks between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) have floundered over the alliance’s refusal to give Moscow legal guarantees that the system would not undermine Russian nuclear forces.
But the diplomatic dance around missile defence cooperation has always been like Kabuki theatre — with officials playing out their designated roles. There is only the illusion of real engagement.
To allay Moscow’s concerns, Washington has invited Russia to participate in the defensive system, helping Nato guard against Iran. But Moscow is unlikely to cooperate on a flawed system against a threat it doesn’t see as imminent.
So during this conference at Lough Erne Resort in Northern Ireland expect to see more luncheons, talks and coffee breaks. But don’t expect anything of military significance to happen. Which is for the best.
Missile defence cooperation between Nato and Russia could produce serious blowback. An alienated China may build up its nuclear arms, and create a domino effect — with both India and Pakistan shoring up their nuclear arsenals in response.
The irony of the entire charade is that the Nato system is known to have serious technological flaws and has never been scientifically tested. Why would Russia want to cooperate on an expensive system that does not work — especially against a threat from Iran and North Korea, which Russia discounts?
The defensive system is designed to intercept enemy warheads in the “midcourse” phase — after launch and before reentry — several hundred kilometres up in space. The big problem, however, is that such a system can be easily short-circuited and rendered toothless.
Missile defence, the scientists point out, is “predicated on the ability to discriminate” real warheads from other targets, “such as rocket bodies, miscellaneous hardware and intentional countermeasures.”
If “the defence should find itself in a situation where it is shooting at missile junk or decoys, the impact on the regional interceptor inventory would be dramatic and devastating!”
So Nato’s interceptor inventory would be exhausted in chasing decoy warheads. For the system still has this fundamental architectural flaw.
How did an untested and unworkable technology make it so far in the Defence Department procurement process? A recent Government Accountability Office report reveals that instead of flying before buying, the Missile Defence Agency has been doing the opposite. Its cart-before-the-horse methodology has resulted in “unexpected cost increases, schedule delays, test problems, and performance shortfalls.”
The agency’s “tests” are more like rigged “demonstrations.” The intercept team knows all the incoming missile’s parameters ahead of time — a luxury it won’t have during a real attack. Even with this, however, many “demonstrations” ended in dismal failure.
So, the question is: If Iran or North Korea could so easily circumvent this vaunted missile defence system, why are the Russians (and Chinese) so up in arms against it?
But the Russians have political as well as scientific concerns. The House Republicans, in particular, are creating diplomatic problems. The Chinese, because of their smaller nuclear arsenal, have also been concerned about the expanding ship-based missile defence system. They fear it may be used to neutralise some of their deterrent forces.
These stockpile increases will likely pressure India, and, in turn, Pakistan to also ramp up their nuclear weapon arsenals.
So Russian and Chinese fears that the US missile defence system has been developed to counter their strategic arsenals are being legitimised by these congressional legislators’ actions and statements.
What should we expect if — by some miracle — Russia and Nato reach an agreement on missile defence cooperation?
Aside from being a waste of Russian taxpayers’ money, it is almost certain that China would react with alarm to such a development. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission suggested, China would likely increase its nuclear arsenal at an accelerated pace.
Missile defence strengthens the hands of over-cautious, misinformed, opportunistic or hawkish elements within the Iranian and North Korean political and military establishments — as well as hardliners in Moscow and Beijing.
This interplay between unknown future capabilities and intentions, as well as domestic pressures for Moscow and Beijing to respond to Nato missile defences would likely increase military expenditures and nuclear arms deployment.
So the central conundrum of midcourse missile defence remains that while it creates incentives for US adversaries and competitors to increase their nuclear stockpiles, it offers no credible protection for the US or its allies.
Instead of focusing on this system, if Washington genuinely wants to achieve some new diplomatic breakthrough during the G8 meeting in Northern Ireland, it could focus on realistic mutual threats.
For example, a US-Russian plan to address the real threat from asteroids. Cooperating on this could indeed bring about rapprochement and goodwill.
Many in the policy community — even those who favor arms control — are advocating for Russia-Nato missile defence cooperation. But why should we expect Moscow to play nice and cooperate on an expensive and dysfunctional system?
Moscow and Washington should reaffirm that they will pare down their bloated nuclear arsenals unilaterally — regardless of how the flawed Nato missile defence plan develops. REUTERS
