Robert Einhorn
By Robert Einhorn
We don’t yet know whether Hasan Rowhani’s election as President of Iran will improve prospects for a nuclear deal — prospects that had dimmed significantly as a result of continued stalemate in the negotiations in the first half of 2013. But if the US and its partners are to take advantage of whatever opportunity may exist post-election, they need to move quickly to review and adjust their approach.
There are reasons for thinking the situation may have changed for the better. The election’s most encouraging development — aside from Rowhani’s win, which was surprisingly decisive — was that it revealed a deep discontent about the country’s hardline diplomatic strategy.
Although several candidates criticised the “no compromises” approach to talks, which was defended by candidate and chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, the sharpest rebuke came from Ali Akbar Velayati, former foreign minister and the supreme leader’s foreign policy adviser.
In the June 7 debate, he said, “When you take three steps and want the other to take 100, it’s clear that you don’t want to advance matters.”
He concluded: “Our current nuclear negotiations definitely have problems; otherwise we would not be in our current situation.”
That critique is remarkable for two reasons. First, Velayati and the other critics are drawing a direct connection between Iran’s rigid negotiating posture and the deprivations suffered by the people as a result of sanctions; they are arguing that Iran must adopt a more conciliatory approach if it wants to reverse its downward economic spiral and rebuild its international standing.
Second, this assessment comes from regime stalwarts but stands in sharp contrast to what Supreme Leader Khamenei and other hardliners have been saying: That the sanctions, while harsh, can be weathered, that the economic difficulties were caused by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement and can be remedied by a new president, and that the sanctions are a blessing in disguise because they encourage self-reliance and reduce dependence on oil revenues.
As Iran reviews its approach, the Obama administration needs to do the same, especially in light of the Iranian election and advances in the Iranian nuclear programme.
There will be a natural tendency within the administration to stand pat for now and wait to see whether the new Iranian government will alter its approach when talks resume. Some officials will argue internally that “we should not negotiate with ourselves” by adjusting our position even before we learn whether Iran has decided to adopt a more serious approach.
Such caution is understandable, especially given Iran’s disappointing track record.
But the “other side must go first” approach doesn’t take into account the domestic difficulties Rowhani will encounter in formulating a new posture, the likelihood that it will be easier for the new Iranian negotiating team to react to ideas put forward by the US and its partners than to initiate ideas of its own, or the fact that time and Iran’s nuclear programme are not standing still.
But whatever tactical approach the US and its partners pursue — to table new proposals, to sit back and wait for Iranian proposals, or to explore new ideas in a non-committal way — they should at a minimum consider among themselves what changes may be necessary to increase prospects of getting the negotiations finally on track.
The toughest issue is, of course, enrichment. Iran has wanted the P5[plus]1 states to publicly accept its “right to enrich” uranium — and to do so right away. Presumably, the Iranians hope that, by gaining early acceptance of what they term an “inalienable” right, they would later be in a strong position to fend off proposals to restrict the scope of their enrichment programme and subject it to special monitoring.
The question of whether the negotiations’ end-state should include a domestic enrichment programme cannot be answered until we have explored such practical arrangements with the Iranians. Such engagement will not be easy for either side. It will require the US and its partners to do what they have so far avoided: talk about what would make an Iranian enrichment programme acceptable.
And it will require the Iranians to recognise that the US and the international community will not accept an unrestricted enrichment programme, but only a regulated capability that denies them the opportunity to convert their programme rapidly or clandestinely to the production of nuclear weapons.
These discussions will be difficult, but it should be possible to reconcile Iran’s stated interest in pursuing enrichment to support its civil nuclear energy plans (which for the foreseeable future are modest in scale) with the international community’s interest in ensuring that Iran does not have a readily available nuclear weapons breakout capability.
In preparation for re-engaging Iran, the Obama administration will also need to work closely with Congress.
Indeed, the counteroffer did not even include an element that senior Iranian officials had long seemed to accept: suspension of the production of enriched uranium at the near-20 percent level.
Much needs to be done to prepare for resumed negotiations with Iran, likely in the fall. In the meantime, Iran’s nuclear programme will move ahead, underlining President Obama’s repeated warning that the window for diplomacy cannot remain open indefinitely.
We don’t know if the recent Iranian election will finally provide an opening to move towards an agreement. But even if prospects for reaching an acceptable deal are limited, the US needs to do everything it can in the weeks and months ahead to prepare itself for any promising opportunity that presents itself when the talks resume. There may not be many more chances.
WP-BLOOMBERG
By Robert Einhorn
We don’t yet know whether Hasan Rowhani’s election as President of Iran will improve prospects for a nuclear deal — prospects that had dimmed significantly as a result of continued stalemate in the negotiations in the first half of 2013. But if the US and its partners are to take advantage of whatever opportunity may exist post-election, they need to move quickly to review and adjust their approach.
There are reasons for thinking the situation may have changed for the better. The election’s most encouraging development — aside from Rowhani’s win, which was surprisingly decisive — was that it revealed a deep discontent about the country’s hardline diplomatic strategy.
Although several candidates criticised the “no compromises” approach to talks, which was defended by candidate and chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, the sharpest rebuke came from Ali Akbar Velayati, former foreign minister and the supreme leader’s foreign policy adviser.
In the June 7 debate, he said, “When you take three steps and want the other to take 100, it’s clear that you don’t want to advance matters.”
He concluded: “Our current nuclear negotiations definitely have problems; otherwise we would not be in our current situation.”
That critique is remarkable for two reasons. First, Velayati and the other critics are drawing a direct connection between Iran’s rigid negotiating posture and the deprivations suffered by the people as a result of sanctions; they are arguing that Iran must adopt a more conciliatory approach if it wants to reverse its downward economic spiral and rebuild its international standing.
Second, this assessment comes from regime stalwarts but stands in sharp contrast to what Supreme Leader Khamenei and other hardliners have been saying: That the sanctions, while harsh, can be weathered, that the economic difficulties were caused by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement and can be remedied by a new president, and that the sanctions are a blessing in disguise because they encourage self-reliance and reduce dependence on oil revenues.
As Iran reviews its approach, the Obama administration needs to do the same, especially in light of the Iranian election and advances in the Iranian nuclear programme.
There will be a natural tendency within the administration to stand pat for now and wait to see whether the new Iranian government will alter its approach when talks resume. Some officials will argue internally that “we should not negotiate with ourselves” by adjusting our position even before we learn whether Iran has decided to adopt a more serious approach.
Such caution is understandable, especially given Iran’s disappointing track record.
But the “other side must go first” approach doesn’t take into account the domestic difficulties Rowhani will encounter in formulating a new posture, the likelihood that it will be easier for the new Iranian negotiating team to react to ideas put forward by the US and its partners than to initiate ideas of its own, or the fact that time and Iran’s nuclear programme are not standing still.
But whatever tactical approach the US and its partners pursue — to table new proposals, to sit back and wait for Iranian proposals, or to explore new ideas in a non-committal way — they should at a minimum consider among themselves what changes may be necessary to increase prospects of getting the negotiations finally on track.
The toughest issue is, of course, enrichment. Iran has wanted the P5[plus]1 states to publicly accept its “right to enrich” uranium — and to do so right away. Presumably, the Iranians hope that, by gaining early acceptance of what they term an “inalienable” right, they would later be in a strong position to fend off proposals to restrict the scope of their enrichment programme and subject it to special monitoring.
The question of whether the negotiations’ end-state should include a domestic enrichment programme cannot be answered until we have explored such practical arrangements with the Iranians. Such engagement will not be easy for either side. It will require the US and its partners to do what they have so far avoided: talk about what would make an Iranian enrichment programme acceptable.
And it will require the Iranians to recognise that the US and the international community will not accept an unrestricted enrichment programme, but only a regulated capability that denies them the opportunity to convert their programme rapidly or clandestinely to the production of nuclear weapons.
These discussions will be difficult, but it should be possible to reconcile Iran’s stated interest in pursuing enrichment to support its civil nuclear energy plans (which for the foreseeable future are modest in scale) with the international community’s interest in ensuring that Iran does not have a readily available nuclear weapons breakout capability.
In preparation for re-engaging Iran, the Obama administration will also need to work closely with Congress.
Indeed, the counteroffer did not even include an element that senior Iranian officials had long seemed to accept: suspension of the production of enriched uranium at the near-20 percent level.
Much needs to be done to prepare for resumed negotiations with Iran, likely in the fall. In the meantime, Iran’s nuclear programme will move ahead, underlining President Obama’s repeated warning that the window for diplomacy cannot remain open indefinitely.
We don’t know if the recent Iranian election will finally provide an opening to move towards an agreement. But even if prospects for reaching an acceptable deal are limited, the US needs to do everything it can in the weeks and months ahead to prepare itself for any promising opportunity that presents itself when the talks resume. There may not be many more chances.
WP-BLOOMBERG
