Dr Andreas Krieg
A lot has been written in recent days about the nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran. Reactions ranged from celebratory in Iran, cautious optimism in the West over deep concerns in the Arab world to full-out fear in Israel.
Iranians celebrate the agreement as an important step out of international isolation – a step that promises Iran to break free from the burden of international sanctions. The West regards the agreement as a victory of diplomacy over the hawkish calls for military action from conservatives. The Arab world remains sceptical about the agreement to say the least; many are concerned that Iran’s apparent willingness to make concessions is a deception plan allowing Iran to continue militarising its nuclear programme under the cloak of purported cooperation. For Israel the agreement is seen as a deal with the devil — a deal with a country that is regarded by the public and policy makers alike, as determined to develop a nuclear device to annihilate the Jewish state. Thus, the assessment of the nuclear agreement is shaped by individual subjective perceptions of Iran’s intentions and objectives. So what does Iran want?
The roots of Iran’s nuclear programme date back to the 1970s. At the time the intentions of the Shah were to prepare Iran’s energy sector with the help of the West, for the post-hydrocarbon era, diversifying energy sources away from hydrocarbons to nuclear power. After the Islamic Revolution international sanctions made it increasingly difficult for the new regime to advance its nuclear ambitions. It was not until the 2000s that the Islamic regime heavily invested into expanding its nuclear programme. New facilities were built — many without the approval or supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Amid the changing regional security environment the pretext for Iran’s nuclear programme changed.
By 2003 Iran saw itself confronted with an increased US presence in the Middle East from Iraq over the Arabian Gulf to Afghanistan. As a consequence, the nuclear programme was no longer just a means of developing alternative sources of energy but regarded by the ayatollahs as a potential means of deterrence.
Despite allegations from Israeli and Western hawks that Iran was trying to develop an offensive nuclear capability targetting the United States and its clients in the region, the military dimension of the nuclear programme was and still is defensive in nature. And this is where the risks lie: a nuclear Iran would render the Islamic Republic untouchable when pursuing its agenda of exporting the Islamic Revolution regionally through irregular proxies. Thus, a nuclear Iran primarily poses a threat to regional players; predominately to the weaker states of the region vulnerable to covert intervention.
Thus, for the international community in general and the West in particular, the Iranian nuclear threat did not rank high on the priority list until the late 2000s. By that time much of Iran’s nuclear programme had already moved underground putting it out of reach of Western military power. While military intervention could and can still disrupt the programme, it would be unable to destroy it. Thus, as there is no viable military option, diplomatic engagement facilitated by the coercive nature of a sanctions regime, remains the only option.
The current agreement is the result of such a diplomatic initiative. So far the agreement is a mere interim understanding to scale back Iran’s nuclear ambitions — a limited understanding merely between Iran and the Great Powers. Under the agreement, Iran is allowed to continue to enrich uranium, keep a significant number of its centrifuges, and retain 300 kg of its highly enriched uranium stockpiles.
All this, with a limited ability of the international community to really enforce the agreement. But although this deal favours Iran, this is the best deal the international community could have reached at this point. It is for the P5+1 to establish a monitoring regime that can ensure Iran’s compliance before starting to gradually lift sanctions. Whatever the nature of this monitoring and enforcement regime, there is no absolute guarantee that Iran will not use its already acquired material and knowhow to develop a military nuclear capability.
Looking forward then, the international community has to balance trust-building efforts with the establishment of a rigid monitoring and enforcement regime in cooperation with
the IAEA.
The easing of sanctions has to be made conditional on the unrestricted access to all Iranian nuclear facilities, including those under the patronage of the Revolutionary Guard. Losing the trust and tacit approval of the religious establishment in Tehran would be bad. Losing the ability to coerce an Iran with a first-strike capability would be even worse.
Dr Andreas Krieg is an assistant professor at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London working at the Jooan Bin Jassim Joint Command and Staff College in Doha, Qatar.
