Aaron David Miller
By Aaron David Miller
The Roman historian Tacitus was right. The best day after the death of a bad emperor is probably the first day.
The Egyptian military’s do-over coup against the Mursi government and the Muslim Brotherhood exhilarated and thrilled millions of Egyptians.
But a move against a democratically elected government — regardless of how incompetent, dysfunctional and misdirected — carries serious consequences for the future of Egypt and the region.
So who won and who lost?
Egypt the movie has been playing for about five millennia. And it’s way too early to make definitive predictions. Right now, there can be no undisputed winners. Still, there are parties that have fared better than others. Call them ‘winners’. Losers are a bit easier to identify. Let’s have a go.
THE Winners
• Bashar Assad: He must be having a good chuckle. Egypt is a huge distraction from the Syrian civil war, and the more preoccupied the international community is with other messes, the less it will focus on the one Assad is making. More than that, the Egyptian people and the military are hammering the Muslim Brotherhood, the very same terrorists and extremists Assad claims were the real cause of the rebellion against his rule.
In his warped conception of reality, he and his military are defending Syria against the same enemies that Egypt is fighting now. In fact, if the SCAF’s move against the Egyptian Brothers leads to more radicalism in the Syrian opposition, so much the better for Assad’s propaganda machine.
• The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF): Let’s give credit where it is due. Amid the dysfunction and incompetence that seem to dominate the region, the Egyptian military did know how to pull off a coup — quickly, relatively bloodlessly, and with tough, aggressive and apparently effective follow-up.
The Muslim Brotherhood has struck back with large street demonstrations that have turned violent. Whether this challenge can be sustained is unclear; but it has put the two least democratic forces in the country on a collision course, with the public backing the army. Indeed, so far the military has the support and encouragement of the majority of those Egyptians who took to the streets in recent days.
But let’s not kid ourselves either. Orchestrating a coup is one thing; governing and transitioning to democracy is another. Last time around, the military was responsible for bumbling, fumbling and downright cruelty — imposing “virginity tests” on women, detaining and imprisoning thousands on political grounds, and killing Egyptians.
Indeed, the real challenge may be that the military doesn’t want to run the country. Who would? It wants to preserve its privileges, yet it will have no choice but to remain the dominant power in the country until some more credible structure can be found.
The key unknown is whether the secular, liberal and Islamist opposition that opposed Mursi can take advantage of the new political space and opportunity the people have provided.
• Al Qaeda’s minions: One hope loosed by the so-called Arab Spring was that Islamist parties would be able to participate in the new democratic politics and that, if they played by the rules, they would be able to gain power through ballots not bullets. A moderate, centrist, political Islam would serve as a rebuke to Al Qaeda’s worldview. I remember analysts in 2011 and 2012 making a big deal of this point as millions of Arabs forced the region’s authoritarians to cede power largely through nonviolence. This seemed a very important development, turning the extremists’ millennial philosophy on its head.
• Israel: For the Israelis, the only thing worse than the Mursi government was an Egypt with no government. Throughout it all, the Israelis have maintained their close ties to the Egyptian military. So for now, I’d put the Israelis in the “win” column. Maybe the Egyptian military will be induced to pay greater attention to lawless Sinai; and certainly Israel won’t object to a less friendly approach to Hamas in Gaza. Still, whatever the future brings — military government or democratic polity — the Egyptian-Israeli relationship will remain a cold one, pending some resolution of the Palestinian issue.
The Losers
• Mursi and the Brothers: I dare say there will be no second act for Mohammed Mursi in Egyptian politics. He’s got no charisma, no political smarts, and no credible case to make for a political future. It’s more than likely jail, exile or the underground for him — a fate that may await the top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, too.
• Hamas: The travails of Mursi and the Brothers will erode the deep bench of Islamists that Hamas in Gaza thought it was assembling in its effort to consolidate control, oppose Fatah, and play its own long game. The Egyptian military has already closed the Rafah border crossing, and there’s no doubt there will be more tough times ahead for the Palestinian Islamists. But if the past is any guide, those tough times won’t be painful enough to force Hamas to moderate its views on a real partnership with Fatah.
• Anne Patterson: Full disclosure, I know and admire Anne Patterson, who has been serving as the US Ambassador in Cairo for two years. She’s smart and capable. And as a result of President Barack Obama’s confused policies, she’s a convenient target for the ‘Who lost Egypt?’ attacks by Republicans and others. If the Egyptian public believed Obama was in bed with the Brothers, that’s not her fault — a few badly timed public statements about faith in elections rather than anti-Mursi protests notwithstanding.
The Future
The more I think about the balance sheet in Egypt, the more it seems to me that there are no quick or easy solutions, just outcomes; no unqualified winners, just those who manage to survive and stay on top — sometimes for a good long while. If the Egyptian people are to win, they’ll need three things they don’t have now: Leaders who think in terms of what’s best for the country, not just for their narrow religious or corporatist group; institutions that are legitimate, inclusive and accountable; and some mechanism that can contain the most divisive and volatile debates so that they don’t spill out into the streets, paralyse the country, and lead to violence. I don’t see that now. But perhaps someday. And then we’ll be able to prove Tacitus wrong.
WP-BLOOMBERG
By Aaron David Miller
The Roman historian Tacitus was right. The best day after the death of a bad emperor is probably the first day.
The Egyptian military’s do-over coup against the Mursi government and the Muslim Brotherhood exhilarated and thrilled millions of Egyptians.
But a move against a democratically elected government — regardless of how incompetent, dysfunctional and misdirected — carries serious consequences for the future of Egypt and the region.
So who won and who lost?
Egypt the movie has been playing for about five millennia. And it’s way too early to make definitive predictions. Right now, there can be no undisputed winners. Still, there are parties that have fared better than others. Call them ‘winners’. Losers are a bit easier to identify. Let’s have a go.
THE Winners
• Bashar Assad: He must be having a good chuckle. Egypt is a huge distraction from the Syrian civil war, and the more preoccupied the international community is with other messes, the less it will focus on the one Assad is making. More than that, the Egyptian people and the military are hammering the Muslim Brotherhood, the very same terrorists and extremists Assad claims were the real cause of the rebellion against his rule.
In his warped conception of reality, he and his military are defending Syria against the same enemies that Egypt is fighting now. In fact, if the SCAF’s move against the Egyptian Brothers leads to more radicalism in the Syrian opposition, so much the better for Assad’s propaganda machine.
• The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF): Let’s give credit where it is due. Amid the dysfunction and incompetence that seem to dominate the region, the Egyptian military did know how to pull off a coup — quickly, relatively bloodlessly, and with tough, aggressive and apparently effective follow-up.
The Muslim Brotherhood has struck back with large street demonstrations that have turned violent. Whether this challenge can be sustained is unclear; but it has put the two least democratic forces in the country on a collision course, with the public backing the army. Indeed, so far the military has the support and encouragement of the majority of those Egyptians who took to the streets in recent days.
But let’s not kid ourselves either. Orchestrating a coup is one thing; governing and transitioning to democracy is another. Last time around, the military was responsible for bumbling, fumbling and downright cruelty — imposing “virginity tests” on women, detaining and imprisoning thousands on political grounds, and killing Egyptians.
Indeed, the real challenge may be that the military doesn’t want to run the country. Who would? It wants to preserve its privileges, yet it will have no choice but to remain the dominant power in the country until some more credible structure can be found.
The key unknown is whether the secular, liberal and Islamist opposition that opposed Mursi can take advantage of the new political space and opportunity the people have provided.
• Al Qaeda’s minions: One hope loosed by the so-called Arab Spring was that Islamist parties would be able to participate in the new democratic politics and that, if they played by the rules, they would be able to gain power through ballots not bullets. A moderate, centrist, political Islam would serve as a rebuke to Al Qaeda’s worldview. I remember analysts in 2011 and 2012 making a big deal of this point as millions of Arabs forced the region’s authoritarians to cede power largely through nonviolence. This seemed a very important development, turning the extremists’ millennial philosophy on its head.
• Israel: For the Israelis, the only thing worse than the Mursi government was an Egypt with no government. Throughout it all, the Israelis have maintained their close ties to the Egyptian military. So for now, I’d put the Israelis in the “win” column. Maybe the Egyptian military will be induced to pay greater attention to lawless Sinai; and certainly Israel won’t object to a less friendly approach to Hamas in Gaza. Still, whatever the future brings — military government or democratic polity — the Egyptian-Israeli relationship will remain a cold one, pending some resolution of the Palestinian issue.
The Losers
• Mursi and the Brothers: I dare say there will be no second act for Mohammed Mursi in Egyptian politics. He’s got no charisma, no political smarts, and no credible case to make for a political future. It’s more than likely jail, exile or the underground for him — a fate that may await the top leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, too.
• Hamas: The travails of Mursi and the Brothers will erode the deep bench of Islamists that Hamas in Gaza thought it was assembling in its effort to consolidate control, oppose Fatah, and play its own long game. The Egyptian military has already closed the Rafah border crossing, and there’s no doubt there will be more tough times ahead for the Palestinian Islamists. But if the past is any guide, those tough times won’t be painful enough to force Hamas to moderate its views on a real partnership with Fatah.
• Anne Patterson: Full disclosure, I know and admire Anne Patterson, who has been serving as the US Ambassador in Cairo for two years. She’s smart and capable. And as a result of President Barack Obama’s confused policies, she’s a convenient target for the ‘Who lost Egypt?’ attacks by Republicans and others. If the Egyptian public believed Obama was in bed with the Brothers, that’s not her fault — a few badly timed public statements about faith in elections rather than anti-Mursi protests notwithstanding.
The Future
The more I think about the balance sheet in Egypt, the more it seems to me that there are no quick or easy solutions, just outcomes; no unqualified winners, just those who manage to survive and stay on top — sometimes for a good long while. If the Egyptian people are to win, they’ll need three things they don’t have now: Leaders who think in terms of what’s best for the country, not just for their narrow religious or corporatist group; institutions that are legitimate, inclusive and accountable; and some mechanism that can contain the most divisive and volatile debates so that they don’t spill out into the streets, paralyse the country, and lead to violence. I don’t see that now. But perhaps someday. And then we’ll be able to prove Tacitus wrong.
WP-BLOOMBERG
