Jamal Khashoggi
By Jamal Khashoggi
Let us imagine that a miracle has taken place, and the Yemeni wisdom overcame the Houthis and Yemenis, and a Yemini peace and partnership agreement was signed in Kuwait. Let us also imagine that the Houthis and Saleh withdrew from the capital and handed over all government offices, and President AbdRabbuh Mansur Hadi returned to Saana with his colleagues. If these happened that would mean we would be back at the starting point whereby Yemen was witnessing crises,but not prosperity. That was the point at which Yemen was seeking remedies to cure its wounds caused by President Abdullah Saleh- that destructive and unstable man. The only good thing that could have happened in this bad situation would have been the situation of no war.
This means that Yemen would return to the starting point, after being burdened with war, shelling, and insurgency, and could cope, but it would be okay as all had agreed to go back to that point.
Let us go back to May 2012 where the late Abdul Karim Al Aryani, a Yemeni Politician, witnessed all the developments and then chaired the national dialogue committee. Al Aryani announced that Houthis had accepted to be members of the committee assigned to prepare a roadmap paving the way to presidential elections, a parliament and a new constitution to build a civic state.
The acceptance was based upon just the requirements of GCC initiative. This was first mistake committed by the Yemenis and the GCC states who sponsored the initiative. Houthis at that time were neither a political party nor a part of the popular revolution that ousted Saleh. They did not believe in the goal of the revolution because they have their own agenda based on old Zaydi heritage which Yemen overcame after the revolution of 1962.
Somebody could say that politics has its own requirements- it was not possible to refuse these. But how could this happen while the Houthis are still keeping to the same agenda? How could the new roadmap, that aims to build a transparent civic state, be successful while they are partners in this new state, despite still carrying weapons and running sleeper cells in the country, and strengthening the influence they gained during past two years? They had taken control of power and, in collaboration with their ally Saleh,controlled the army, security agency and civic institutions.
We should look at the mistakes that pushed Yemen into this condition,in order not to repeat them. There are four mistakes. The first one was the refusal of the “Arab Spring”,at least in the Yemeni context.
We preferred to deal with the Arab Spring as a conspiracy and chaos, but actually it was the ambition of the people- especially the youth who longed to set up a transparent regime. Yemen was struggling for this since the revolution of 1948 that rejected tyranny based on “divine right” for power. Yemenis called it a racist regime based on the Zaydi school of thought, limiting the right of rule to the Hashmi family throughout a thousand years.
The matter became worse when the regime was associated with injustice, illiteracy and poverty during the tenure of Al Hamiduddin. The revolution of ‘48 was full of bloodshed, followed by the revolution of ‘62 that was no less bloody. Actually it was fiercer and it turned into a civil war for eight years.
The military rulers of Yemen, who inherited the reigns of power, one by one after the Emam regime, did not bring Yemen closer to a wise or just regime, and were worse than Emam in corruption and oppression. The ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh was a good example. He was a repeat model of other Arab countries that witnessed rulers like Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Gaddafi in Libya among others.
Such a dilemma makes it impossible to expect a solution to Kuwait’s talks. The negotiations were held between the Yemeni people, demanding justice and power sharing, and Saleh, representing an old Arab system based on family rule and army at every cost- no problem, even if generals came to power one by one.
After the Arab Spring, that appeared successful in Egypt, it has still witnessed destabilisation, despite all the support that the regime was getting. Therefore it is necessary to accept the outcome and demands of the Arab Spring in post war Yemen. No voice should be listened to against it including that of the Houthi allies of Saleh.
The Houthis rejected the outcome of Arab Spring for several reasons, notably their faith in the principle of “divine right” that was obvious to notice during their negotiations after the revolution of 2012, despite all their efforts to conceal it. They were exploiting the protests and streamlining these to serve their vested interests, without discharging their liabilities.
The second mistake was not continuing with the way that was opened after the revolution of 2011. More specifically, I mean the process of democracy and elections. In this regard, the issue that needs to be presented, by Saudi Arabia and GCC states, to the international community, who is pressuring them to stop the war, is the issue of compliance to the UN resolution 2216.
Although the UN resolution 2216 supports the GCC initiative, especially in areas of “political transition”, it requires the election of a president, election of a parliament and preparation of new constitution.
Or perhaps the Western alliance are pressing us to end the war without taking into account the Houthi’s and Ali Saleh’s failure to comply with the UN resolution requirements. This situation was faced, with GCC and Yemeni hesitation paving the way for Houthis and Ali Saleh to evade it and to impose a new reality on the ground by controlling rule by force. This situation encouraged some Western powers to seek undemocratic solutions, assuming that democracy does not suit Arabs as many of their intellectuals promote this unfortunately.
Yemenis have begun to deal with what has been called the “American” initiative”- very similar to the Iraqi model which was based on sectarian quotas. This is very bad idea, which must be rejected by the Yemenis before Saudis because it is enough to see the situation in Iraq.
The third mistake is the protection granted to Saleh in the GCC initiative and extended to the influential groups within the government “deep state”. This immunity made Saleh and his group safe and encouraged them to regain power and topple the legitimate government.
Yemen today, like Syria, is the victim of the theory of fear of the “collapse of the state”. It is an argument that has benefited the most influential elements in the country in their aim to maintain the former regime. Such a situation requires continuing to the end with the political transition and state building, with new institutions, and with new leaders who have nothing to do with former regime.
The fourth mistake was the marginalisation of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al Islah) which is a mistake that has been remedied wisely by Saudi Arabia and President Hadi by addressing the unjustifiable regional hesitation towards this party. The party was targeted by the Houthis and Saleh who believe that the party clashing with their aims is one of the major political movements in Yemen.
All that I have said above depends upon the unexpected miracle in Kuwait, which is the success of the conflicting parties to reach agreement to pave way for building a modern Yemen.
