Robert Kagan
The military may create a new generation of Islamist fighters, some percentage of whom may turn to terrorism.
By Robert Kagan
Twice last month, the Egyptian military opened fire on supporters of ousted president Mohammed Mursi, killing more than 100 people. A few days ago, the military’s leader, General Abdel Fattah Al Sissi, asked Egyptians to go into the streets and give him a popular “mandate” to fight “terrorism.” On Wednesday, the military-backed government ordered security forces to break up protests in Cairo.
The stage is set for a deadly government assault not only against the Muslim Brotherhood but also against the millions of Egyptians who voted for the Brotherhood in elections over the past two years. Combined with the arrests on trumped-up charges of Mursi and others linked to the Brotherhood, the military appears intent on eradicating the organisation from Egypt’s politics, jailing its leaders and followers or driving them underground.
Through its continued support of the Egyptian military, the US is complicit in these acts. Despite our repeated claims of neutrality and our calls for reconciliation, in reality we have taken sides in the burgeoning violent confrontation.
We winked at the coup against a democratically elected government, and, most important, we remain the leading provider of assistance to Egypt’s military: Even as violent and undemocratic intentions have become increasingly clear, the administration and Congress are pressing ahead with the annual provision of $1.3bn in military assistance.
Some supporters of the aid claim that it gives us leverage over the military’s behaviour — that fear of an aid cutoff will curb Sissi’s more extreme inclinations and lead the government to moderation. Recent events suggest the opposite. Why should military leaders fear losing aid when the Obama administration did not even abide by US law requiring it to cut off that aid after the coup? The recent delay of F-16 deliveries had no effect.
Egypt’s military knows there has been only one constant in US policy toward its country over the past three decades, including during the turbulence of the past three years: Regardless of who has been in power — Hosni Mubarak, the military, Mursi and now the military again — and how that government has behaved, military assistance has flowed. We didn’t use our military aid to pressure Mubarak to reform; we didn’t use it to pressure Mursi to govern more democratically; and we are not using it now to pressure the military to cease its violent, undemocratic behaviour.
Leverage works only if there is a chance that it will be used. Given the US history of unwavering support for the Egyptian military, its threats to end aid have no credibility. At this point, only an actual cutoff or suspension would shape the military’s calculations. To those who argue that we must continue providing aid in the interest of stability, one has only to point to the past three years: Aid has flowed uninterrupted, and just look at all the stability.
Today the most destabilising force in Egypt is the military itself. It is the greatest obstacle to any hope of political reconciliation and stability. The Brotherhood’s followers, who just last year chose peaceful competition in an electoral system, now see their leaders hunted down and their comrades killed in the streets — all by a US-backed military. In the US, commentators call on the Brotherhood to join the political process and, in the words of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, halt “its war with the military.”
Yet the Brotherhood and its followers did not choose this war. While the military seeks their extermination, it will be hard for them to believe that they will have a place in post-coup Egypt’s political order.
Suspending aid now is not merely a matter of principle or even of abiding by our own laws — although that ought to count for something. As a practical security matter, we may pay a heavy price down the road for our complicity in the military’s actions over the coming months.
As a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center recently told Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, the Brotherhood is not Al Qaeda.
The Brotherhood renounced violence and terrorism years ago. But that could change in response to the military’s actions. Who knows how many more the military will arrest, torture and kill in pursuit of its goal of driving the Brotherhood’s followers back underground? In the process, Egypt’s military may create a whole new generation of Islamist fighters, some percentage of whom may turn to terrorism. If and when they do, the US, as the Egyptian military’s great and unwavering backer, will again become a target.
WP-BLOOMBERG
The military may create a new generation of Islamist fighters, some percentage of whom may turn to terrorism.
By Robert Kagan
Twice last month, the Egyptian military opened fire on supporters of ousted president Mohammed Mursi, killing more than 100 people. A few days ago, the military’s leader, General Abdel Fattah Al Sissi, asked Egyptians to go into the streets and give him a popular “mandate” to fight “terrorism.” On Wednesday, the military-backed government ordered security forces to break up protests in Cairo.
The stage is set for a deadly government assault not only against the Muslim Brotherhood but also against the millions of Egyptians who voted for the Brotherhood in elections over the past two years. Combined with the arrests on trumped-up charges of Mursi and others linked to the Brotherhood, the military appears intent on eradicating the organisation from Egypt’s politics, jailing its leaders and followers or driving them underground.
Through its continued support of the Egyptian military, the US is complicit in these acts. Despite our repeated claims of neutrality and our calls for reconciliation, in reality we have taken sides in the burgeoning violent confrontation.
We winked at the coup against a democratically elected government, and, most important, we remain the leading provider of assistance to Egypt’s military: Even as violent and undemocratic intentions have become increasingly clear, the administration and Congress are pressing ahead with the annual provision of $1.3bn in military assistance.
Some supporters of the aid claim that it gives us leverage over the military’s behaviour — that fear of an aid cutoff will curb Sissi’s more extreme inclinations and lead the government to moderation. Recent events suggest the opposite. Why should military leaders fear losing aid when the Obama administration did not even abide by US law requiring it to cut off that aid after the coup? The recent delay of F-16 deliveries had no effect.
Egypt’s military knows there has been only one constant in US policy toward its country over the past three decades, including during the turbulence of the past three years: Regardless of who has been in power — Hosni Mubarak, the military, Mursi and now the military again — and how that government has behaved, military assistance has flowed. We didn’t use our military aid to pressure Mubarak to reform; we didn’t use it to pressure Mursi to govern more democratically; and we are not using it now to pressure the military to cease its violent, undemocratic behaviour.
Leverage works only if there is a chance that it will be used. Given the US history of unwavering support for the Egyptian military, its threats to end aid have no credibility. At this point, only an actual cutoff or suspension would shape the military’s calculations. To those who argue that we must continue providing aid in the interest of stability, one has only to point to the past three years: Aid has flowed uninterrupted, and just look at all the stability.
Today the most destabilising force in Egypt is the military itself. It is the greatest obstacle to any hope of political reconciliation and stability. The Brotherhood’s followers, who just last year chose peaceful competition in an electoral system, now see their leaders hunted down and their comrades killed in the streets — all by a US-backed military. In the US, commentators call on the Brotherhood to join the political process and, in the words of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, halt “its war with the military.”
Yet the Brotherhood and its followers did not choose this war. While the military seeks their extermination, it will be hard for them to believe that they will have a place in post-coup Egypt’s political order.
Suspending aid now is not merely a matter of principle or even of abiding by our own laws — although that ought to count for something. As a practical security matter, we may pay a heavy price down the road for our complicity in the military’s actions over the coming months.
As a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center recently told Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, the Brotherhood is not Al Qaeda.
The Brotherhood renounced violence and terrorism years ago. But that could change in response to the military’s actions. Who knows how many more the military will arrest, torture and kill in pursuit of its goal of driving the Brotherhood’s followers back underground? In the process, Egypt’s military may create a whole new generation of Islamist fighters, some percentage of whom may turn to terrorism. If and when they do, the US, as the Egyptian military’s great and unwavering backer, will again become a target.
WP-BLOOMBERG
