Philippe de Koning and Phillip Y
By Philippe de Koning and Phillip Y Lipscy
Since returning to office in December, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has done little to reassure his neighbours that Japan comes in peace. Within his first two weeks of office, he ordered a review of his country’s defence guidelines, which his defence minister, Itsunori Onodera, described as “a priority we must work on with no letup.” On July 26, Japan’s Defence Ministry released interim results of the review, urging significant military upgrades. It included plans to create an amphibious island defence force, and hinted at the possibility of preemptive strikes against foreign military targets.
Over the last seven months, Abe’s staunchly nationalistic views and desire to revise Japan’s post-war constitution, which prohibits the use of military capabilities except in self-defence, have exacerbated tensions with China and South Korea. A Pew Research Centre poll, released in July, found that 85 percent of Chinese and South Koreans view Abe unfavourably, and that sentiment towards Japan has worsened sharply. The now regular flare-ups over the disputed Senkaku islands in the East China Sea have increased the risk of conflict between Japan and China, which calls the islands the Diaoyu. And Abe’s decisive victory for the Liberal Democratic Party in late July’s upper house elections brought him closer to the two-thirds legislative majorities in both houses of the Diet required to initiate constitutional reform.
There is a paradox at the heart of Abe’s bluster. Although his calls for a stronger military have worried his neighbours, a decade of budget cuts and a struggling economy means that Japan’s military is surprisingly feeble. Despite Abe’s bluster, the real threat posed by Japan is not that its military is growing too strong, but that it is rapidly weakening.
Even accounting for the 0.8 percent increase contained in Abe’s 2013 budget, Japan’s annual defence budget has declined by over 5 percent in the last decade. During the same period, China’s defence budget increased by 270 percent (South Korea’s and Taiwan’s grew by 45 percent and 14 percent, respectively.) In dollar terms, Japan’s defence budget was 63 percent larger than China’s in 2000, but barely one-third the size of China’s in 2012. In fact, since 2000, Japan’s shares of world and regional military expenditures have fallen by 37 percent and 52 percent, respectively. Japan’s defence review will likely frighten its neighbours more than it will improve the military.
Japanese defence policymakers have coped by extending the life of military hardware, such as submarines, destroyers, and fighter jets. As a result, Japan’s focus has shifted from acquisition to preservation, and maintenance costs have skyrocketed: at the end of the Cold War, maintenance spending was roughly 45 percent the size of procurement expenditures; it is now 150 percent.
Abe would be wise to use his new, large legislative majorities to pursue pragmatic reforms instead of ideological ones. A constitutional revision that relaxes constraints on Japan’s military will be a hollow victory if the country’s economy and military capabilities sink into oblivion.
Japan would be better served if Abe’s party expands the prime minister’s bold economic plan into a long-term reform program that addresses the country’s enduring problems: economic stagnation, public debt, and demographic decline. Indeed, Abe’s attempts to boost defence spending are unsustainable unless these underlying structural issues are resolved.
Tackling these issues will do far more to restore Japan’s international status and credibility than symbolic gestures that stoke nationalism and antagonise Japan’s neighbours. WP-BLOOMBERG
By Philippe de Koning and Phillip Y Lipscy
Since returning to office in December, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has done little to reassure his neighbours that Japan comes in peace. Within his first two weeks of office, he ordered a review of his country’s defence guidelines, which his defence minister, Itsunori Onodera, described as “a priority we must work on with no letup.” On July 26, Japan’s Defence Ministry released interim results of the review, urging significant military upgrades. It included plans to create an amphibious island defence force, and hinted at the possibility of preemptive strikes against foreign military targets.
Over the last seven months, Abe’s staunchly nationalistic views and desire to revise Japan’s post-war constitution, which prohibits the use of military capabilities except in self-defence, have exacerbated tensions with China and South Korea. A Pew Research Centre poll, released in July, found that 85 percent of Chinese and South Koreans view Abe unfavourably, and that sentiment towards Japan has worsened sharply. The now regular flare-ups over the disputed Senkaku islands in the East China Sea have increased the risk of conflict between Japan and China, which calls the islands the Diaoyu. And Abe’s decisive victory for the Liberal Democratic Party in late July’s upper house elections brought him closer to the two-thirds legislative majorities in both houses of the Diet required to initiate constitutional reform.
There is a paradox at the heart of Abe’s bluster. Although his calls for a stronger military have worried his neighbours, a decade of budget cuts and a struggling economy means that Japan’s military is surprisingly feeble. Despite Abe’s bluster, the real threat posed by Japan is not that its military is growing too strong, but that it is rapidly weakening.
Even accounting for the 0.8 percent increase contained in Abe’s 2013 budget, Japan’s annual defence budget has declined by over 5 percent in the last decade. During the same period, China’s defence budget increased by 270 percent (South Korea’s and Taiwan’s grew by 45 percent and 14 percent, respectively.) In dollar terms, Japan’s defence budget was 63 percent larger than China’s in 2000, but barely one-third the size of China’s in 2012. In fact, since 2000, Japan’s shares of world and regional military expenditures have fallen by 37 percent and 52 percent, respectively. Japan’s defence review will likely frighten its neighbours more than it will improve the military.
Japanese defence policymakers have coped by extending the life of military hardware, such as submarines, destroyers, and fighter jets. As a result, Japan’s focus has shifted from acquisition to preservation, and maintenance costs have skyrocketed: at the end of the Cold War, maintenance spending was roughly 45 percent the size of procurement expenditures; it is now 150 percent.
Abe would be wise to use his new, large legislative majorities to pursue pragmatic reforms instead of ideological ones. A constitutional revision that relaxes constraints on Japan’s military will be a hollow victory if the country’s economy and military capabilities sink into oblivion.
Japan would be better served if Abe’s party expands the prime minister’s bold economic plan into a long-term reform program that addresses the country’s enduring problems: economic stagnation, public debt, and demographic decline. Indeed, Abe’s attempts to boost defence spending are unsustainable unless these underlying structural issues are resolved.
Tackling these issues will do far more to restore Japan’s international status and credibility than symbolic gestures that stoke nationalism and antagonise Japan’s neighbours. WP-BLOOMBERG
