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Views /Opinion

GCC priorities post-Camp David

Dr Abdullah Al Shayji

02 Jun 2015

By Dr Abdullah Al Shayji

Our previous article, ‘Camp David… Assurances without Guarantees’ published last week received wide coverage and follow-up in Arab media outlets such as satellite channels and news websites. 
I received a copy of my article and enjoyed reading it and listening to it as it was also an audio recorded by one news websites.
This demonstrates that there is a broad follow-up and monitoring of what my other colleagues and I write in the ‘Views’ pages, which in turn reflects the value of the message Al Ittihad newspaper conveys to Arab readers.
We must acknowledge that we returned from the Camp David Summit with an assurance that we have to be more realistic and we did not get what we went there for. 
Hence, we have to work on two tracks — strengthening our military and strategic capabilities; and counting more on our means and less on the American side, which was not interested in upgrading our strategic relationship to the same level as its other allies like Japan and South Korea.
America also did not seem interested in committing itself legally and constitutionally to defend its Gulf partners, more than making a verbal pledge by President Barack Obama when he claimed “having a steel commitment to defend his partners.”
Since the summit, President Obama presented an approach that revealed some facts, in an interview with Goldberg, the correspondent of The Atlantic, at a synagogue in Washington last week. 
It seems that the best possible agreement between the Americans and their Gulf counterparts will relatively enhance the security of countries in the region that will seek to establish a common defence system, armour missiles, an early warning system, joint training and exercises, weapons deals, and coordination of security intelligence and military between both sides.
This will also improve strategic relationships in the future with Gulf countries, which do not enjoy the status of a major US ally outside Nato — namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Oman — as it has been the same situation with Kuwait and Bahrain for more than a decade. 
That will give those countries more coordination and recognition of the eligibility for sophisticated weapons, with training and qualification for security and military harmonisation, and more privileges, even financial aid. 
But with the existence of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), there will be no American financial assistance to acquire weapons.
The status of a key ally is considered the most essential type of relation between the US and its allies outside Nato.
This alliance consists of 15 countries around the world and includes Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia that recently joined. 
The last countries that were awarded this status by Obama were Afghanistan, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Thailand.
Obama has reiterated his position on two occasions after the Camp David Summit to reassure those who have doubts that there is going to be a final nuclear deal with Iran.
He emphasised that the agreement will be signed at the end of this June, which is the best possible scenario, and that it will carry Obama’s signature and will ensure the freezing of Iran’s nuclear programme (not terminating it).
In the interview, Obama said that he had reassured the Gulf leaders that their situation will be better by relying on American support instead of engaging in nuclear programmes to counterbalance Iran. 
He also said: “The protection that we offer them as our best partners in the area is the best way to prevent Iran from any nuclear energy programme that could stand as a deterrence factor.”
The deterioration of the situation before and after the Camp David Summit such as the expansion of ISIS and the emergence of its new branches, requires all GCC countries that fight ISIS in Syria and the Houthis in Yemen to execute a radical change in the strategy and methods of confrontation. 
It is clear that the previous constants are no longer capable of addressing the fast and dangerous variables. 
Today, we are in the heart of the storm, and this requires us to change our old approach, methods and previous alliances.
(To be continued)