Khalid Al Dakhil
By Khalid Al Dakhil
The Russian escalation in Syria was the result of three factors: First, the Russian leadership recognises that the position of its ally President Bashar Al Assad has become increasingly critical over time. It is a fact that this president is constantly losing, even if he has achieved some successes, which were mostly temporary.
Second, passing of the nuclear deal with Iran in the US Congress might tempt President Barack Obama to harvest its political price on Syrian territory, which is something that will be on Moscow’s account as much as it will be on Tehran’s. The Kremlin’s escalation in this case is a proactive step to enhance Al Assad’s capabilities and strengthen Russia’s position in preparation for such an eventuality.
Third, the escalation came after the trilateral Doha meeting between the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, the United States and Russia to particularly discuss a solution for Syria.
This escalation came after the Saudi foreign minister’s visit to Moscow. Then, the Doha meeting took place after the Russian mediation between Riyadh and Damascus came to a standstill, reaching its peak by Ali Mamlouk’s visit to Jeddah in July, being the first security man of the Assad regime.
This visit was not accounted for in the worst nightmares of the Syrian crisis. But it seems that Saudi Arabia wanted to accept the Russian proposal and provide a concession of this size to Moscow to demonstrate that it practically desires to find a solution to the crisis.
All this indicates that Russia has not changed its stance on Assad, not necessarily adherent to the person, but rather an expression of the Russian position that the stalemate in the crisis is an extension of the same predicament of the Syrian president, its ally.
Thus, the military escalation came after Moscow failed to change the Saudi and American stance on Assad’s permanence. That is, it chose to exert pressure on the Saudis and Americans over Syrian territory, instead of back-staging diplomatic negotiations. Why?
Whatever the motives of the Russians, when you consider their position with the Iranians, it shows to what extent the future of Syria has been, long ago, out of control of the Syrian president and his political and security staff.
Since 1963, the Syrian president became president by virtue of a fait accompli imposed by force of arms and security agencies. He was never a president by virtue of legitimacy and the constitution, regardless, Syrians accepted this fait accompli.
At the time, at least, the Syrian president was president by virtue of a Syrian de facto. But now, he turned into a bargaining chip in the hands of others. He became president by virtue of a fait accompli that is not Syrian at all. The Syrian president is like agencies of foreign brands at home. He is a president by virtue of Iranian, Russian, and Lebanese and Iraqi militias’ interests.
Is he really in this case a president or a leader of the largest militia with major external support? It is no longer the Syrians who are providing protection for their president, since he is under the protection of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the Shia militias and Russian military.
The most amazing part of it all is that Bashar Al Assad put himself in this situation, by first taking the decision to declare war on his own people since the beginning of the uprising, and then by introducing terrorists and bringing them into the scene being the best option to depend upon either to stay in power, or to retain his share in case division is the only option for Syria.
For the first time in Syrian history, its army destroyed the country instead of protecting its borders, which became wide open to both allies and enemies.
Is there room after all this to question the Russian escalation under the vacuum that was left by the US withdrawal and the Arabs’ disagreement over Syria?
