Roudi Baroudi
The Athens Energy Dialogues in late January covered a lot of ground, but it’s the seabed – specifically, who owns and/or controls which parts of it in the Eastern Mediterranean – that will decide the region’s future. The sooner these issues get sorted out by intelligent energy diplomacy leading to mutual agreement, the sooner all of the countries involved can start enjoying the benefits of the region’s extensive oil and gas reserves. And any effort to get this done has to start with an acknowledgment that (only international law can be the standard by which shares are freely and fairly apportioned; and b) only the United States can be the catalyst that gets this done in a safe and timely manner.
By now, even casual observers of the Eastern Mediterranean have some understanding what is at stake: there are enough hydrocarbons beneath the seabed to not only transform the futures of all the coastal states (Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt), but also to significantly improve the energy situations of countries in Western Europe, East Africa, and even South Asia. Producers will be able to instantly slash their own energy costs, and those that export will also earn significant hard-currency revenues, improving fiscal balances and funding unprecedented investments in modern essentials such as schools, hospitals, and efficient transport systems. Even states that prove not to possess game-changing reserves of their own will have new opportunities to secure affordable and reliable energy supplies, process and ship oil and gas belonging to their neighbors, cash in on transit fees for pipelines that cross their territory, and/or reap indirect rewards by hosting support industries offering everything from laundry and catering to maintenance and communications.
As historic as such developments would be, there is no secret to making them happen. There is no shortage of companies qualified to locate and extract the resources, no shortage of engineers who can do so safely and efficiently, and no shortage of investors willing to stake the necessary ventures. The only real obstacles are geopolitical ones tied to the fact that more than three quarters of the region’s maritime boundaries remain unresolved. This means that much of the area’s oil and gas will remain unreachable because all those companies, engineers, and investors need to know who owns the resources in question before they can start exploiting them. In my view, the revenues and resulting socioeconomic gains to be generated by the Levantine Basin and other East Med hydrocarbon fields justify an all-out diplomatic effort, mainly because these benefits could also herald a new and long-awaited period of geostrategic calm across the region.
For much of history, such ownership questions have been settled by force or the threat thereof, and almost always in favor of larger and more powerful entities. The Eastern Mediterranean is no stranger to the logic of “might makes right”, which itself explains why so many countries here remain at odds with one another, unwilling to cooperate among themselves, and therefore unable to deliver the kinds of socioeconomic outcomes their peoples deserve. This has been the region’s experience in the past, but it doesn’t have to be our destiny going forward. So long as the coastal states resolve to settle their differences peacefully and then stick to their decisions, the necessary diplomatic and commercial tools are within easy reach.
Since the end of World War II, the vast majority of countries have acquiesced to the erection of a new international system, one that decides bi- and multilateral disputes on the basis of law rather than military power. The principal engine for this process has been the United Nations, which has spawned dozens of treaties and institutions tasked with fostering the rule of law.
With regard to the present discussion, the most important of these is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Among other things, UNCLOS lays down the legal standards for resolving maritime boundary disputes, and its core principles apply in all instances, whether the parties negotiate directly or indirectly, submit to some form of arbitration, or seek adjudication from the International Court of Justice or other qualified tribunal. In fact, UNCLOS enjoys such widespread acceptance that even some countries that have not signed or ratified the treaty have nonetheless recognized its applicability to their own situations.
But UNCLOS, like the United Nations itself, is not perfect. For most purposes, but particularly those involving multiple states, implementing the procedures for dispute resolution under this kind of international law depends on the enthusiasm of the states involved. In his landmark “Agenda for Peace” report of 1992, then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pointed out that the world body can only promote this kind of preventive diplomacy: frequently, ensuring that the relevant parties take part relies on the willingness of member states to support the process. Then as now, the key nation is the United States, which still has more power, influence, and prestige than any other. Nowhere is this truer than in the Eastern Med, where its politico-military presence outstrips all others and where it maintains close to ties to individual countries that have little or no contact between themselves. For anyone interested in unlocking the region’s undersea oil and gas resources, then, America is the key.
It may not be easy. Much of the UN’s purpose has recently been questioned and even undermined by some of its original champions, including some of the most influential voices in American politics, who argue that their country’s unique global role entitles it to greater freedom of action than others. The trick in the Eastern Med, therefore, relies at least to some extent on convincing US officials that in this instance, America really is the indispensable nation – and that it stands to make important gains by taking the process under its wing.
The basic benefits for Washington’s traditional concerns are clear. Enhanced security, stability, and prosperity in the Eastern Med would serve multiple US foreign-policy objectives, including more freedom of navigation, healthier trade flows, and fewer demands on its already overstretched military. In addition, even the most hawkish American strategists understand that oftentimes, the best war is the one that doesn’t have to be fought: no casualties to explain, no trillion-dollar bills to be paid, no collateral damage to justify, no disagreements over who won, no disabled veterans to care for, etc.
My own reading of history, informed by long experience in both the region and the industry, including personal involvement in a variety of UN and European Union policymaking processes, has led me to the conclusion that a truly grand gambit is more than justified at this point. Specifically, the time is right for the US, the UN, and the EU to jointly invite all of the East Med countries to take part in a comprehensive dialogue on maritime border delineation. In the initial stages at least, some of these collaborative discussions would have to be conducted indirectly, but all proceedings would have to take place “by the book” – i.e., according to the rules and technical guidelines of UNCLOS.
Even as the UN was being shaped in the bloody shadow of World War II, then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles noted that given the increasingly dangerous nature of modern war, the United States had some very powerful reasons “to wage peace vigorously and relentlessly”. Today, in the aftermath of various wars undertaken over the past three decades, his words ring truer still. Given both the rewards on offer if we succeed and the risks in play if we fail (or don’t even try), now would be a great time to demonstrate that dialogue and cooperation are very much synonymous with civilization itself.
*Roudi Baroudi is CEO of Energy and Environment Holding, an independent consultancy based in Doha, Qatar.
